2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>  Hi,
>>
>> let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark,
>>
>
> I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me,
> so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and
> immortality even well before.
> OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the "Tegmark point"
>  in my 1991 "Mechanism and Personal Identity" paper, i.e. the point that
> the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who
> can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to
> illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and
> the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first
> person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of
> the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that
> they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not
> an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA.
>
>
>
>  a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside
>> HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with
>> the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not
>> killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed).
>>
>> You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on
>> the experimenter surviving (or not).
>>
>> So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive,
>> you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet
>> on him die.
>>
>> What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the
>> experimenter will survive for the following reason:
>>
>> If MWI is true:
>>
>> 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is
>> no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$
>> 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you
>> did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd
>> test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a
>> draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did
>> lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$,
>> that make 300$ in your pocket.
>>
>> From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter
>> lives from your POV or not.
>>
>> In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money...
>> you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test.
>>
>>
>> So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should
>> live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot
>> branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the
>> 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or
>> win money.
>>
>
>
> OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win
> individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more "fair
> ontologically", because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the
> descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with
> the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure.
> They just don't exist, in the "non lucky" collapse scenario.
> You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to
> the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse.
>
> What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as
> with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but
> there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI,
> there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the
> question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be
> collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning).
>
> For the witnesses, your bet is more "socially fair", but not in way making
> possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI.
>

I still stand on "repeated improbable outcome" implies either MWI or QM
false.

If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean
anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of
1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from
your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is
in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could
not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good*
explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is
falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus
is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to
QM+collapse) so it still stand.

So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or
MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such
improbable occurence should be disproven... In MWI you have that good
explanation principle, which is in MWI it *does* happen.

Quentin


>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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