2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Hi, >> >> let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark, >> > > I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me, > so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and > immortality even well before. > OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the "Tegmark point" > in my 1991 "Mechanism and Personal Identity" paper, i.e. the point that > the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter, who > can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to > illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and > the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first > person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of > the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that > they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not > an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA. > > > > a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put aside >> HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed with >> the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is not >> killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed). >> >> You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on >> the experimenter surviving (or not). >> >> So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he survive, >> you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if you bet >> on him die. >> >> What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the >> experimenter will survive for the following reason: >> >> If MWI is true: >> >> 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there is >> no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$ >> 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you >> did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd >> test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a >> draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did >> lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$, >> that make 300$ in your pocket. >> >> From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter >> lives from your POV or not. >> >> In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money... >> you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test. >> >> >> So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter should >> live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot >> branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the >> 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or >> win money. >> > > > OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win > individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more "fair > ontologically", because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the > descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with > the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure. > They just don't exist, in the "non lucky" collapse scenario. > You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to > the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse. > > What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as > with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but > there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI, > there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the > question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be > collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning). > > For the witnesses, your bet is more "socially fair", but not in way making > possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI. >
I still stand on "repeated improbable outcome" implies either MWI or QM false. If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good* explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to QM+collapse) so it still stand. So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such improbable occurence should be disproven... In MWI you have that good explanation principle, which is in MWI it *does* happen. Quentin > > Bruno > > > > >> Quentin >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<email@example.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<firstname.lastname@example.org> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.