On 16 Jan 2013, at 20:29, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/16/2013 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jan 2013, at 23:18, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/15/2013 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jan 2013, at 07:54, meekerdb wrote, to Jason:

Consider the quantum suicide experiment, or the Shrodinger's cat experiment from the perspective of the cat. From the first- person perspective consciousness cannot end, regardless of how low the third-person probability may be.

But that's just a semantic trick. The first-person perspective consciousness can still be finite. Just because "the end" isn't part of the experience, it doesn't follow that the sequence of experiences continues indefinitely. I've had my consciousness interrupted. There was no mathematical/logical necessity that it resume.

Of course. But if you assume either QM, or comp, there are.

Comp maybe. QM doesn't require that consciousness continue.

What would it mean to observe anything if consciousness does not continue (locally)?

An "observation" in QM is just instantiating the value of a projection operator in a quasi-classical form. There is nothing prevent others people and instruments from observing things after I cease to.

You are right. That's the main interest of QM without collapse. But you still need a notion of "consciousness continues" to get the phenomenological reduction of the wave packet. Everett assumes a form of psycho-brain link which works very well if you assume the SWE. But with comp, this does not work (cf UDA), and you have to extract a phenomenological SWE from the diophantine number relations.



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