On 16 Jan 2013, at 20:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/16/2013 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2013, at 23:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/15/2013 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2013, at 07:54, meekerdb wrote, to Jason:
Consider the quantum suicide experiment, or the Shrodinger's
cat experiment from the perspective of the cat. From the first-
person perspective consciousness cannot end, regardless of how
low the third-person probability may be.
But that's just a semantic trick. The first-person perspective
consciousness can still be finite. Just because "the end" isn't
part of the experience, it doesn't follow that the sequence of
experiences continues indefinitely. I've had my consciousness
interrupted. There was no mathematical/logical necessity that
Of course. But if you assume either QM, or comp, there are.
Comp maybe. QM doesn't require that consciousness continue.
What would it mean to observe anything if consciousness does not
An "observation" in QM is just instantiating the value of a
projection operator in a quasi-classical form. There is nothing
prevent others people and instruments from observing things after I
You are right. That's the main interest of QM without collapse. But
you still need a notion of "consciousness continues" to get the
phenomenological reduction of the wave packet. Everett assumes a form
of psycho-brain link which works very well if you assume the SWE. But
with comp, this does not work (cf UDA), and you have to extract a
phenomenological SWE from the diophantine number relations.
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