On 16 Jan 2013, at 07:15, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 10:23 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 8:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 8:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 5:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Then why do we find ourselves in a world where everyone has only
life from their childhood to now?
All conscious states are experienced, even if everyone is truly
immortal it does't mean we always have access to or are
experiencing all our memories all the time. How much of your
current life are you recalling at any given moment?
To answer your question, we are either original biological humans
or someone else experiencing what it was like to be an original
biological human. When this life ends the consciousness original
biological humans ends, but it continues as the someone else who
experienced that original biological human's life.
But as I understand your theory we are nothing but sequences of
experiences - so if the sequence continues (and I don't know how
you distinguish one continuation from a another)
I don't bother trying as I've realized it is futile. I've found
only two workable definitions of "you" which don't lead to
contradictions:
1) Each observer moment has its own unique experiencer.
2) All observer moments belong to the same experiencer.
The latter at least leads to useful decision theories (like why
bother getting out of bed in the morning), while the former seems
to lead to nihilism. I prefer the second one.
I love it how empirical contradiction is so easily dismissed.
The theory that you are everyone is not falsified by our experience
(the examples I gave above show that one don't need to remember
experiencing something in order to have experienced it or to be
experiencing it (as a duplicate)).
"To be experiencing it as a duplicate (but not remember)" is just
double-talk.
Assume if MWI were true. You would be experiencing those many other
worlds, but you (the Brent Meeker in this branch) can't recall those
experiences of those other worlds.
It just trashes the concept of person, which it pretends to explain.
Science has shown that the particular matter and material are not
important for personal identity.
That's a too quick and strong statement. It is just that science
provides evidence for comp, but we cannot know if it is true. I guess
you were just quick as I have no doubt you agree with this. OK? Comp
might be false, and particular matter might play a role.
I do agree with your point though.
Bruno
That leaves little else aside from memories, to serve as a marker to
preserve personal identity. Therefore many people people assume it
must be the memories that are crucial to defining the person. But
there are flaws with this. If you are concentrating very hard
taking some test, it seems almost all your personal memories could
be disconnected from you and you wouldn't notice. Who then is it
that is taking the test? Also, consider that you were definitely
alive and fully conscious when you were experiencing the 14th bite
of your breakfast 296 days ago, but you probably have no memory of
it. Who was it that was conscious of that moment?
Do you think you could be a person without memory (ever known
someone with severe Alzheimer's?).
Yes I think so. Anyone who is conscious is a person and I don't see
memories as a requirement for awareness. How do you define
personhood?
Further, this theory makes makes fewer assumptions than the single-
life theories. Those theories contain an additional assumption
that there is some process of selection which led to you being born
as you and no one else.
A sentence that made sense up until "as you...".
I was going to say "as Brent Meeker" but wanted my message to be
general to other readers of my post.
What is your justification for adding this additional assumption
when the theory itself explains why we can't recall the
perspectives of other people?
It doesn't explain it.
Your brain is not physically wired to other people's brains, so why,
when I ask Brent Meeker if he recalls experiencing what it is like
to be me, should Brent Meeker answer yes? (Bear in mind from other
examples memory is no guarantee of what one has or hasn't
experienced. If you think you can show that one must have a memory
of something to have experienced it, please provide some argument or
proof.)
In fact it denies there are other people (thus violating Bruno's
religion).
I'll allow Bruno to comment on whether he thinks a universal self
contradicts CTM.
It is just like the collapse postulate, which you are also fond
of. It serves no useful purpose and needlessly complicates the
theory.
No useful purpose except making the theory useful.
Please explain how it does this.
Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
