On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 10:23 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 1/15/2013 8:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 8:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 1/15/2013 5:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 1/15/2013 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Then why do we find ourselves in a world where everyone has only life >>>> from their childhood to now? >>>> >>>> >>> All conscious states are experienced, even if everyone is truly immortal >>> it does't mean we always have access to or are experiencing all our >>> memories all the time. How much of your current life are you recalling at >>> any given moment? >>> >>> To answer your question, we are either original biological humans or >>> someone else experiencing what it was like to be an original biological >>> human. When this life ends the consciousness original biological humans >>> ends, but it continues as the someone else who experienced that original >>> biological human's life. >>> >>> >>> But as I understand your theory we are nothing but sequences of >>> experiences - so if the sequence continues (and I don't know how you >>> distinguish one continuation from a another) >>> >> >> I don't bother trying as I've realized it is futile. I've found only two >> workable definitions of "you" which don't lead to contradictions: >> >> 1) Each observer moment has its own unique experiencer. >> 2) All observer moments belong to the same experiencer. >> >> The latter at least leads to useful decision theories (like why bother >> getting out of bed in the morning), while the former seems to lead to >> nihilism. I prefer the second one. >> >> >> I love it how empirical contradiction is so easily dismissed. >> > > > The theory that you are everyone is not falsified by our experience (the > examples I gave above show that one don't need to remember experiencing > something in order to have experienced it or to be experiencing it (as a > duplicate)). > > > "To be experiencing it as a duplicate (but not remember)" is just > double-talk. > Assume if MWI were true. You would be experiencing those many other worlds, but you (the Brent Meeker in this branch) can't recall those experiences of those other worlds. > It just trashes the concept of person, which it pretends to explain. > Science has shown that the particular matter and material are not important for personal identity. That leaves little else aside from memories, to serve as a marker to preserve personal identity. Therefore many people people assume it must be the memories that are crucial to defining the person. But there are flaws with this. If you are concentrating very hard taking some test, it seems almost all your personal memories could be disconnected from you and you wouldn't notice. Who then is it that is taking the test? Also, consider that you were definitely alive and fully conscious when you were experiencing the 14th bite of your breakfast 296 days ago, but you probably have no memory of it. Who was it that was conscious of that moment? > Do you think you could be a person without memory (ever known someone > with severe Alzheimer's?). > > Yes I think so. Anyone who is conscious is a person and I don't see memories as a requirement for awareness. How do you define personhood? > > Further, this theory makes makes fewer assumptions than the single-life > theories. Those theories contain an additional assumption that there is > some process of selection which led to you being born as you and no one > else. > > > A sentence that made sense up until "as you...". > I was going to say "as Brent Meeker" but wanted my message to be general to other readers of my post. > > > > What is your justification for adding this additional assumption when the > theory itself explains why we can't recall the perspectives of other > people? > > > It doesn't explain it. > Your brain is not physically wired to other people's brains, so why, when I ask Brent Meeker if he recalls experiencing what it is like to be me, should Brent Meeker answer yes? (Bear in mind from other examples memory is no guarantee of what one has or hasn't experienced. If you think you can show that one must have a memory of something to have experienced it, please provide some argument or proof.) > In fact it denies there are other people (thus violating Bruno's religion). > > I'll allow Bruno to comment on whether he thinks a universal self contradicts CTM. > > It is just like the collapse postulate, which you are also fond of. It > serves no useful purpose and needlessly complicates the theory. > > > No useful purpose except making the theory useful. > Please explain how it does this. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.