On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 1:36 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 1/26/2013 11:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 12:09 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 1/26/2013 9:53 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I think what you are describing comes automatically with comp, as any >> observer only knows their direct observations, which could be created by >> any one of an infinite number of possible programs going through the same >> state. Any one of these programs will have its own consistent history, but >> unless analyzed or explored further, that information is in a sense, >> undecided. It is like: "Before you finish reading the second half of this >> sentence, the color of your toothbrush could have been any possible >> color." However, now that you have finished reading it, and performed a >> memory look up you have changed the set of possible programs manifest your >> consciousness. It is almost scary to think, when you aren't looking or or >> imagining/recalling what your mother, your wife, your children, they could >> look like or be almost anything (within some constraints of what is >> compatible with your experience in the moment you are not thinking of >> them). And it is only when we "stop and think" we can for a time, lock >> down that possibility. >> >> >> 'You' are only a consistent history of experiences too, and so 'you' >> could be almost anything also. But this fails to explain the >> intersubjective agreement of observers: That you AND your wife agree on >> what your children look like. >> > > I don't see why it should fail to explain that agreement. Any fact you > become conscious of should be consistent with all the other current content > of your mind and immediately perceptible environment (which includes the > apparent behavior of others). > > > But you've begged the question by saying its a *fact* you become conscious > of. You have conscious experiences, including inferences about the world, > but the inferences don't necessarily correspond to facts of the external > reality. So our hypothesis about the world and our relation to it must > explain not only the consistency of intersubjective agreement, but also the > inconsistencies of our errors and illusions. > > > Do you see a contradiction that appears in my my description? I am not seeing it. > > > >> So unless you are a solipist, just dreaming your wife's agreement, an >> external reality becomes a good hypothesis. >> > > I think there is an underlying reality which explains the consistency of > experiences. I don't see why anything I said above implies the absence of > an external reality nor solipsism. > > > No it doesn't. But the hypothetical external reality then obviates the > worries you expressed above about your wife being 'almost anything' when > you aren't looking. > Well they don't manifest as "Oh no I am lost in the wrong universe, I thought I was married to a blonde but now she is a brunette.", so in that sense, it is not a rational fear to have. It is merely a strange and unsettling thing to understand that when consequence of some fact is not part of your current observer moment, said fact is indeterminant (in many possible states) until you bring some consequence of that fact into your current observer moment. Jason > > Brent > > That external reality just happens to be so big and so varied that it is > easy for observers (or souls) to get lost in it. > > Jason > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2013.0.2890 / Virus Database: 2639/6054 - Release Date: 01/24/13 > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
