On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 02 Feb 2013, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Feb 1, 2013 at 6:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 01 Feb 2013, at 09:46, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno, >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 31 Jan 2013, at 15:15, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> Hi Telmo Menezes >>> >>> Perhaps you're right, but to my limited knowledge, >>> a quantum has infinite paths available between >>> points A and B without invoking another universe. >>> >>> >>> Once we are able to use (classical) information obtained in the other >>> quantum paths, like when doing a Fourier transform on some superposition >>> of many computations, like in a quantum computer, what makes them different >>> of other universes? >>> >> >> The superposition of many computations itself. Superposition of states on >> a same universe are a bit hard to swallow. I think people reject the idea >> of a multiverse because it sounds loony, but my understanding is that >> making QM consistent with a single universe requires magical thinking. >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> It's the same as saying that consciousness emerges from neural activity. >> People overlook the magical step because they are more confortable with the >> resulting model. >> >> >> Totally OK. UDA and MGA are supposed to make that magic step quite >> palatable. >> > > But UDA and MGA propose that consciousness supervenes on neural states, > not that it emerges or is caused by them, correct? > > > > UDA (including MGA = step 8) shows that comp (I can survive a digital > brain transplant) entails that eventually the brains and bodies supervene > on sequences of computational states, which are actually arithmetical > relation. (having chosen arithmetic for the ontology, anything Turing > universal theorey will do). > > MGA throws out the physical supervenience thesis: the idea that > consciousness relies on this or that (physical or not) implementations of a > computations. Consciousness is associated to all computation in arithmetic. > This can be related with the first person indeterminacy. > Ok, I'm more familiar with the UDA than the MGA. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> Naturalism used magic without saying, but our brains is gifted for this, >> and that makes sense in the evolutive struggle of life. >> >> I think we agree, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> So no problem. >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>> *Time:* 2013-01-31, 08:13:30 >>> *Subject:* Re: Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> In the one universe model, where does the extra computational power of >>> quantum computers come from? >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Telmo Menezes >>>> IMHO more than one universe is unjustified. >>>> >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>>> *Time:* 2013-01-30, 12:10:08 >>>> *Subject:* Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>> >>>> Hi Roger, >>>> >>>> I find it harder to believe in finite universes. Why the precise >>>> number, whatever it is? >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 12:46 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Stephen P. King >>>>> It's easier to believe in salvation through faith or UFOs than >>>>> infinite universes. >>>>> >>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>> *From:* Stephen P. King <[email protected]> >>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>>>> *Time:* 2013-01-28, 09:20:33 >>>>> *Subject:* About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> >>>>> 牋 I think this paper might be fodder for a nice discussion! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295 >>>>> >>>>> About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>>> Francisco Jos Soler >>>>> Gil<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Gil_F/0/1/0/all/0/1> >>>>> , Manuel >>>>> Alfonseca<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Alfonseca_M/0/1/0/all/0/1> >>>>> (Submitted on 22 Jan 2013 (v1 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295v1>), >>>>> last revised 23 Jan 2013 (this version, v2)) >>>>> >>>>> This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and >>>>> Brundrit, based on classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga >>>>> and Vilenkin, based on the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics, both of >>>>> which conclude that, in an infinite universe, planets and living beings >>>>> must be repeated an infinite number of times. We point to some possible >>>>> shortcomings in the arguments of these authors. We conclude that the idea >>>>> of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be considered >>>>> strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and cosmology. Such >>>>> ideas should be seen rather as examples of {\guillemotleft}ironic >>>>> science{\guillemotright} in the terminology of John Horgan. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Onward! >>>>> >>>>> Stephen >>>>> >>>>> ____________________________________________________________________ >>>>> *DreamMail* - The first mail software supporting source tracking >>>>> www.dreammail.org >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit 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