I hate to refresh an old-old topic, but... what is really your context of a "machine"? (In the usual verbiage it points to some 'construct of definite parts with definite functions' or the like.) I doubt that 'your' universal machine can be inventoried in KNOWN parts only. Or; that it may have a blueprint. Or whether you have an idea what kind of driving force to apply to get it work? (all regular points inthe usual lingo). I had such discussion with people about 'organism', about 'system' - none so far about (my?) infinite complexity. Is 'your' univesal machine something close to it? then please, tell me, I have no idea about mine.
John M On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 04 Feb 2013, at 18:18, John Mikes wrote: > > Here is another one about intelligence: > My definition goes back to the original Latin words: to *READ* *between *- > lines, or words that is. To understand (reflect?) on the unspoken. A reason > why I am not enthusiastic about AI - a machine (not Lob's universal > computer) does not overstep the combinations of the added limitations. > Intelligence is anticipatory. > > > The universal (Löboian or not) machine is still a machine. And it can make > anticipation. There is a whole branch of theoretical computer science > studying the ability of machine in anticipation. > It is quite interesting and most proofs are necessarily non constructive, > and so this cannot be used in AI. But there are also a lot of engineering > work with practical application. A programs already inferred correctly the > presence of nuclear submarines in a place where most experts estimated that > being impossible, notably. > > Theoretical computer science shows also that the more a machine is clever, > the less we can predict her behavior, the more that machine can be wrong, > the more that machine can benefit from working with other machines, etc. > Few doubt that such machine can "read between". > > Bruno > > > > > JohnM > > On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> How can be " *PHYSICAL*" - *'physical'*? >> (and please, don't tell "because we THINK so") >> >> John M >> >> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Roger, >>>>> >>>>> I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of >>>>> physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're >>>>> surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human >>>>> chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock >>>>> traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. >>>>> >>>> >>>> When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very >>>> fast. This writer gives a good explanation: >>>> http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers >>>> >>> >>> Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've >>> given are made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They >>> will never understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I >>> don't see how that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here. >>> >>> Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind. >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, >>>>> people say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will >>>>> never be able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same >>>>> thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel >>>> special, to be able to say that you are above their bias? >>>> >>> >>> I have and it might be true. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. >>>>> >>>> >>>> An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer >>>> science, particularly AI. >>>> http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html >>>> >>> >>> I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing). >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi [email protected] and Craig, and all, >>>>>> >>>>>> How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? >>>>>> How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? >>>>>> How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? >>>>>> >>>>>> IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/leibniz-mind/<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/> >>>>>> >>>>>> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it >>>>>> is *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and >>>>>> motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would >>>>>> enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive >>>>>> it >>>>>> enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter >>>>>> into >>>>>> it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting >>>>>> within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by >>>>>> which >>>>>> to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in >>>>>> the >>>>>> composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. >>>>>> >>>>>> Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon >>>>>> entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and >>>>>> the >>>>>> relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or >>>>>> consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter >>>>>> how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them >>>>>> reveals >>>>>> that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. >>>>>> Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the >>>>>> purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena >>>>>> of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is >>>>>> of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of >>>>>> materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from >>>>>> the >>>>>> *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to >>>>>> Bayle*(1702), are revealing in this regard: >>>>>> >>>>>> Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity >>>>>> which corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing >>>>>> could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, >>>>>> however organized it may be. >>>>>> >>>>>> But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads >>>>>> of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience >>>>>> refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the >>>>>> consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things >>>>>> which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures >>>>>> and >>>>>> movements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and >>>>>> consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as * >>>>>> one* conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so >>>>>> cannot be regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of >>>>>> a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's >>>>>> oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the >>>>>> simple >>>>>> of the compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature >>>>>> and Grace,* sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine >>>>>> Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and >>>>>> sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed >>>>>> into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible >>>>>> entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If >>>>>> perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a >>>>>> representation >>>>>> of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may >>>>>> construct >>>>>> Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that >>>>>> matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A >>>>>> perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a >>>>>> true >>>>>> unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. >>>>>> Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely >>>>>> divisible. >>>>>> Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be >>>>>> identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be >>>>>> identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, >>>>>> materialism is false. >>>>>> >>>>>> Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in >>>>>> principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, >>>>>> that >>>>>> characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness >>>>>> of >>>>>> perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some >>>>>> historical >>>>>> interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections >>>>>> to >>>>>> certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have >>>>>> objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought >>>>>> experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and >>>>>> consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the >>>>>> mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>>> *From:* [email protected] >>>>>> *Receiver:* Everything List >>>>>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 01:39:35 >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: Science is a religion by itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> > On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > 燞i [email protected] <javascript:> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics, >>>>>> > > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life, >>>>>> > intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all >>>>>> physics. How >>>>>> > could it really be otherwise? >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Craig >>>>>> ====== >>>>>> >>>>>> In the name of reason and common sense: >>>>>> How could it really be otherwise? >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>>> com. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en.<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.> >>>>>> For more options, visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out.<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ______________________________**______________ >>>>>> *DreamMail* - New experience in email software www.dreammail.org >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>>> >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>>> . >>>>>> For more options, visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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