On 05 Feb 2013, at 17:38, John Mikes wrote:

I hate to refresh an old-old topic, but...
what is really your context of a "machine"?
(In the usual verbiage it points to some 'construct of definite parts with definite functions' or the like.)

That's a good idea. I use the term machine for digital machine. They become relatively concrete when implemented by a universal machine (a computer) which implements yourself too (this makes sense with comp). Then I use the mathematical definition of machine and computer, due to Turing, Church, Post etc.

I am neutral, at the start, if some computer plays some special role (like a physical universe). Then the reasoning shows that this cannot be the case and that concreteness is something capable of being explains by the relative statistics on the computations.




I doubt that 'your' universal machine can be inventoried in KNOWN parts only.

Yes, it can. take your computer. It is made of little entities with well defined function. Take the comp hypothesis, it supposes that if we look close enough to a brain, we can find small parts with well defined functions, that we can indeed replaced by functionally equivalent one, without changing the subjective experience of the person supported by the brain.

The the reasoning shows that the "matter" composing those little parts, have to emerge from the coherence of infinitely many (immaterial) computations, which exists in arithmetic.



Or; that it may have a blueprint. Or whether you have an idea what kind of driving force to apply to get it work? (all regular points inthe usual lingo).

The "force" are given by the universal numbers which implement those machines, in the mathematical sense of implementation. Digital machine theory is a branch of arithmetic. That's why we have to explain the apparent force from arithmetic.




I had such discussion with people about 'organism', about 'system' - none so far about (my?) infinite complexity. Is 'your' univesal machine something close to it? then please, tell me, I have no idea about mine.

A universal machine is a computer, as discovered by mathematician. Some could say that a concrete computer is only a physical approximation, but thanks to digitalness, the relation between them can be made precise, although it is not simple (and requires UDA, etc.).

If we fix the TOE as arithmetic. A universal machine is entirely defined by a universal number u such that the uth computable functions in the arithmetical enumeration computes, on x, and y, the xth computable function on the input y. It is like the golem, you 'type' the program x and the data y on the front of the universal machine, and it emulates the machine defined by x on the input y.

Bruno





John M



On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 04 Feb 2013, at 18:18, John Mikes wrote:

Here is another one about intelligence:
My definition goes back to the original Latin words: to READ between - lines, or words that is. To understand (reflect?) on the unspoken. A reason why I am not enthusiastic about AI - a machine (not Lob's universal computer) does not overstep the combinations of the added limitations. Intelligence is anticipatory.

The universal (Löboian or not) machine is still a machine. And it can make anticipation. There is a whole branch of theoretical computer science studying the ability of machine in anticipation. It is quite interesting and most proofs are necessarily non constructive, and so this cannot be used in AI. But there are also a lot of engineering work with practical application. A programs already inferred correctly the presence of nuclear submarines in a place where most experts estimated that being impossible, notably.

Theoretical computer science shows also that the more a machine is clever, the less we can predict her behavior, the more that machine can be wrong, the more that machine can benefit from working with other machines, etc. Few doubt that such machine can "read between".

Bruno




JohnM

On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
How can be " PHYSICAL" - 'physical'?
(and please, don't tell "because we THINK so")

John M

On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:



On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Roger,

I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on.

When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very fast. This writer gives a good explanation: http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers

Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've given are made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They will never understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I don't see how that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here.

Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind.


Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we have, a need to feel special.

Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel special, to be able to say that you are above their bias?

I have and it might be true.



WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science.

An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer science, particularly AI. http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html

I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing).



Craig



On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi socr...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all,

How can intelligence  be physical ? How can meaning be physical ?
How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ?
How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ?

IMHO You need to consider what is really going on:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness.

In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this regard:

Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements.

Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside” (Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false.

Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness of perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some historical interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982).



----- Receiving the following content -----
From: socra...@bezeqint.net
Receiver: Everything List
Time: 2013-02-02, 01:39:35
Subject: Re: Science is a religion by itself.

On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
> > 燞i socr...@bezeqint.net <javascript:>
>
> > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics,
> > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will.
>
> If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life,
> intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. How
> could it really be otherwise?
>
> Craig
======

In the name of reason and common sense:
How could it really be otherwise?

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