On 09 Feb 2013, at 22:47, Telmo Menezes wrote:


Let's say Wr is a world

But this might be ambiguous. If by Wr you mean the "real physical world", it can only mean, when we assume comp, that Wr is the real sum on all simulation or computations which exist in arithmetic (by UDA). That "real world" is typically not emulable by a computer, as it is an infinite actual sum on infinities of emulations/computations.

No prob. I just meant a world. I chose r (poorly) because it comes before s, so Wr, Ws. I wasn't trying to imply that Wr is _the_ real world.

OK. I took r = real, and s = simulated. But then we did agree.








and Ws is a world simulated in a computer within Wr.

OK. (with the precision just above).




There's the system S, which can be instantiated in the real world (Sr) or in the simulation (Ss). Then there's Bruno (B). Finally, part of what we mean by S is the ability to perform some function by interacting with Bruno, let's say F(S, B). I'm saying that:

if F(Ss, B) then Ss is an emulation for B, otherwise it's a simulation.

I would say: if F(Ss, B) = F(Sr, B) then there is a sense to say that relatively to B, Ss is an emulation.

Even better.

But I am not sure emulation/simulation should be thought in that relative way. This is an interesting idea, but it does not bear on the the original emulation/simulation idea. basically an emulation is just an exact imitation. This makes sense for digital processes.

Ok, but "exact imitation" still feels a bit ambiguous to me.

The technical "exact imitation" can be defined with the compiler theorem. For any bases phi_i and phi'_i you can find a computable function F such that for all i if phi'_(F(i)) = phi_i for all inputs. And an intensional version, with the notion of equivalent algorithm can be given too (but is much longer to describe). You can write a fortran program emulating a game of life pattern, and you can find a game of life pattern emulating a fortran program. A fortran user would not see the difference (except in time execution).

(By a base phi_i, I mean an enumeration P1, P2, P3, ... of all programs in some Turing universal system, with the corresponding phi_1, phi_2, phi_3 ... functions (from N to N, say)).










Of course we can consider F(Ss, Br) and F(Ss, Bs), but it's still relative to what B we're talking about. Furthermore, for F(Ss, Br) to be true there must exist some interface between Ws and Wr -- which can be uni or bidirectional depending on F.

OK. Again with the proviso that there are no real Wr. Wr is only what B can expect from its first person indeterminacy, which bears only on the many arithmetical computations, be them simulation or emulation (of what?), going through its relevant (from the 1p perspective) computational state. OK?

Ok.

OK.

Bruno










 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emulator


It just means that there is an exact simulation. The intensional Church thesis (which is a simple consequence of the usual Church's thesis) makes all programs emulable by all universal programs. With a mac, you can emiulate a PC, but you can also emulate a complete PC with the keyboard, and if comp is correct you can emulate the PC, its keyboard, and the user. You can emulate fire on a MAC, and it can burn anyone emulated on that mac and interacting with the emulated fire (again assuming comp). The correct level of comp is defined by the one which make yourself being emulated by the artificial brain or body, or local universe.

Ok, I agree with what you say here. You can turn a very good simulation into an emulation (for me) iff you emulate my mind inside the simulation.

Yes. And this might help to understand why we don't need a primary (assumed) physical reality, as the number relations contains all possible emulations. Note that the MGA says something stronger: it says that not only we don't need a physical primary reality, but that even if that existed, we can't use it to relate any form of consciousness to it. By the usual Occam, weak-materialism is made into a sort of useless principle, a bit like vitalism in biology.

Ok. I have no resistance to the idea to begin with but I'm looking forward to fully understanding the argument. Materialism feels like a cop-out, similar to a god-creator.

Yes. Indeed. After MGA, (UDA step 8), substratum-matter can be introduced with the purpose of single out one reality, with unique conscious state in it, but only by making it both non Turing emulable and non first person indeterminacy recoverable (which is already not Turing emulable). This is asking a lot for just being unique and material. It is like invoking a God to select one branch of a quantum universal wave. It makes us very special, just to avoid a much simpler type of explanation. It does not mean that the idea of God is bad, but that type of God use is just contrary to the usual weak Occam razor used at the meta-level in the applied science.

Bruno



Bruno





Bruno







Bruno





Simulation - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster ...

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation
a : the imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process by means of the functioning of another <a computer simulation of an industrial process> ...

Definition of EMULATION

1
obsolete : ambitious or envious rivalry
2
: ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement)
3
a : imitation
b : the use of or technique of using an emulator
— em·u·la·tive adjective
— em·u·la·tive·ly adverb


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 17:07:32
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses




On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com > wrote:


On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:



On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal
�
I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
context to any燾alculation, including comp.

Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.


I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing emulation of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are dying of dehydration.

Hi Craig,

Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on the following statements:

- The human brain can be Turing emulated.

I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. Can fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire on the level of the machine itself.

Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in a computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators in the real world.
So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but it is a sculpture.

I see what you mean, but more on that later.
�


- There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human brain and consciousness.


The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately.

Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is necessary.
It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all space but constrained to as single instant of time.

See if my post from last night makes it clearer: 
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/

Interesting post.

You say:�
"In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive personal history."
So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an emulation of my brain?



Craig

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