On Wednesday, February 6, 2013 6:19:03 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> On 05 Feb 2013, at 14:14, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno, >> >> The definitons of simulation and emulation I can find both use the word >> "imitation". >> Can you explain what you mean as being the difference between the two ? >> >> >> A computer can simulate a storm. It can also simulate another computer. >> In this case, when we simulate digital events by a digital machine, we can >> define a notion of totally faithful simulation. This what is called an >> emulation. Some mac, for example, emulate some PC. >> In fact any universal machine can emulate all possible digital machinery. >> This is why they are said universal. >> > > I would argue that "totally faithful simulation" is not enough. Simulation > implies a simulated environment, while emulation has to work in the > emulated thing's environment. This is trivial for a mac emulating a PC. It > already has a keyboard, a display and a mouse. If you want to emulate fire, > it actually has to be able to burn you. Or emulating a complete human being > would require a robot. >
Exactly. A computer cannot 'simulate a storm', it can simulate a picture of a storm in the eyes of a person. Nothing else in the universe can know or care that some blinking pixels on a screen are supposed to correspond to an atmospheric phenomenon. The picture is a text for the human eye and human mind, not for soil and sky of this planet. Even a simulation of a computer is not totally faithful. I cannot simulate an upgrade of a 2 GHz processor virtual computer to 3 GHz on a 1 GHz hardware node. Even within the realm of computers we cannot escape the bottom level resource requirements, which are of a fundamentally different nature than the logical requirements of writing an emulation. It doesn't matter how perfect of an emulation you write, you are not going to get 3 GHz virtual performance on a 1GHz physical machine. Craig > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> *Simulation* - *Definition* and More from the Free Merriam-Webster >> *...*<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation> >> www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/*simulation* >> a : the *imitative *representation of the functioning of one system or >> process by means of the functioning of another <a computer *simulation*of an >> industrial process> >> *...* >> ** >> Definition of *EMULATION* >> 1 >> *obsolete* *:* ambitious or envious rivalry >> 2 >> *:* ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement) >> 3 >> *a* *:* *imitation* <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imitation> >> *b* *:* the use of or technique of using an >> emulator<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emulator> >> — *em·u·la·tive* *adjective* >> — *em·u·la·tive·ly* *adverb* >> >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> >> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> >> *Time:* 2013-02-04, 17:07:32 >> *Subject:* Re: context, comp, and multiverses >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg >> <[email protected]<javascript:> >> > wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>>>>> � >>>>>> I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive >>>>>> context to any燾alculation, including comp. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable. >>>>>> That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is >>>>> actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not >>>>> geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing >>>>> emulation >>>>> of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop >>>>> of >>>>> Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we >>>>> actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are >>>>> dying of dehydration. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hi Craig, >>>> >>>> Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on >>>> the following statements: >>>> >>>> - The human brain can be Turing emulated. >>>> >>> >>> I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. >>> Can fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the >>> cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will >>> work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire >>> on the level of the machine itself. >>> >> >> Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in >> a computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators >> in the real world. >> � >> >>> >>> So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but >>> it is a sculpture. >>> >> >> I see what you mean, but more on that later. >> � >> >>> >>> >>>> - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human >>>> brain and consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>> The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human >>> quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually >>> the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately. >>> >> >> Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is >> necessary. >> � >> >>> >>> It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all >>> time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all >>> space but constrained to as single instant of time. >>> >>> See if my post from last night makes it clearer: >>> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/ >>> >> >> Interesting post. >> >> You say:� >> "In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives >> meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive >> personal history." >> � >> So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an >> emulation of my brain? >> >> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>> . >>>>> � >>>>> � >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<javascript:> >>> . >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> � >>> � >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> ____________________________________________________________________ >> *DreamMail* - Your mistake not to try it once, but my mistake for your >> leaving off. use again www.dreammail.org >> <%--DreamMail_AD_END--> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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