On Wednesday, February 6, 2013 6:19:03 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
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> On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 05 Feb 2013, at 14:14, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>>  Hi Bruno,
>>  
>> The definitons of simulation and emulation I can find both use the word 
>> "imitation".
>> Can you explain what you mean as being the difference between the two ?
>>
>>
>> A computer can simulate a storm. It can also simulate another computer. 
>> In this case, when we simulate digital events by a digital machine, we can 
>> define a notion of totally faithful simulation. This what is called an 
>> emulation. Some mac, for example,  emulate some PC. 
>> In fact any universal machine can emulate all possible digital machinery. 
>> This is why they are said universal.
>>
>
> I would argue that "totally faithful simulation" is not enough. Simulation 
> implies a simulated environment, while emulation has to work in the 
> emulated thing's environment. This is trivial for a mac emulating a PC. It 
> already has a keyboard, a display and a mouse. If you want to emulate fire, 
> it actually has to be able to burn you. Or emulating a complete human being 
> would require a robot.
>

Exactly. A computer cannot 'simulate a storm', it can simulate a picture of 
a storm in the eyes of a person. Nothing else in the universe can know or 
care that some blinking pixels on a screen are supposed to correspond to an 
atmospheric phenomenon. The picture is a text for the human eye and human 
mind, not for soil and sky of this planet.

Even a simulation of a computer is not totally faithful. I cannot simulate 
an upgrade of a 2 GHz processor virtual computer to 3 GHz on a 1 GHz 
hardware node. Even within the realm of computers we cannot escape the 
bottom level resource requirements, which are of a fundamentally different 
nature than the logical requirements of writing an emulation. It doesn't 
matter how perfect of an emulation you write, you are not going to get 3 
GHz virtual performance on a 1GHz physical machine.

Craig

 
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>  *Simulation* - *Definition* and More from the Free Merriam-Webster 
>> *...*<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation> 
>> www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/*simulation*
>> a : the *imitative *representation of the functioning of one system or 
>> process by means of the functioning of another <a computer *simulation*of an 
>> industrial process> 
>> *...*
>> ** 
>>  Definition of *EMULATION*
>>  1
>> *obsolete* *:* ambitious or envious rivalry 
>>  2
>> *:* ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement) 
>>  3
>> *a* *:* *imitation* <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imitation> 
>> *b* *:* the use of or technique of using an 
>> emulator<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emulator> 
>> — *em·u·la·tive* *adjective* 
>> — *em·u·la·tive·ly* *adverb* 
>>  
>>  
>>
>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> 
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>  *Time:* 2013-02-04, 17:07:32
>> *Subject:* Re: context, comp, and multiverses
>>
>>   
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: 
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Hi Bruno Marchal 
>>>>>> �
>>>>>> I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
>>>>>> context to any燾alculation, including comp. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
>>>>>> That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  
>>>>> I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is 
>>>>> actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not 
>>>>> geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing 
>>>>> emulation 
>>>>> of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop 
>>>>> of 
>>>>> Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we 
>>>>> actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are 
>>>>> dying of dehydration.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Craig,
>>>>
>>>> Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on 
>>>> the following statements:
>>>>
>>>> - The human brain can be Turing emulated.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. 
>>> Can fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the 
>>> cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will 
>>> work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire 
>>> on the level of the machine itself.
>>>
>>
>> Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in 
>> a computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators 
>> in the real world.
>> �
>>
>>>
>>> So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but 
>>> it is a sculpture.
>>>
>>
>> I see what you mean, but more on that later.
>> �
>>
>>>
>>>    
>>>> - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human 
>>>> brain and consciousness.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human 
>>> quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually 
>>> the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately.
>>>
>>
>> Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is 
>> necessary.
>> �
>>
>>>
>>> It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all 
>>> time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all 
>>> space but constrained to as single instant of time.
>>>
>>> See if my post from last night makes it clearer: 
>>> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/
>>>
>>
>> Interesting post.
>>
>> You say:�
>> "In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives 
>> meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive 
>> personal history."
>> �
>> So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an 
>> emulation of my brain?
>>
>>  
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>>    
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>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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