On 06 Feb 2013, at 12:19, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 05 Feb 2013, at 14:14, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno,

The definitons of simulation and emulation I can find both use the word "imitation". Can you explain what you mean as being the difference between the two ?

A computer can simulate a storm. It can also simulate another computer. In this case, when we simulate digital events by a digital machine, we can define a notion of totally faithful simulation. This what is called an emulation. Some mac, for example, emulate some PC. In fact any universal machine can emulate all possible digital machinery. This is why they are said universal.

I would argue that "totally faithful simulation" is not enough. Simulation implies a simulated environment, while emulation has to work in the emulated thing's environment. This is trivial for a mac emulating a PC. It already has a keyboard, a display and a mouse. If you want to emulate fire, it actually has to be able to burn you. Or emulating a complete human being would require a robot.

This is not the standard definition in computer science. It has nothing to so with emulating the environment (the data) or not. It just means that there is an exact simulation. The intensional Church thesis (which is a simple consequence of the usual Church's thesis) makes all programs emulable by all universal programs. With a mac, you can emiulate a PC, but you can also emulate a complete PC with the keyboard, and if comp is correct you can emulate the PC, its keyboard, and the user. You can emulate fire on a MAC, and it can burn anyone emulated on that mac and interacting with the emulated fire (again assuming comp). The correct level of comp is defined by the one which make yourself being emulated by the artificial brain or body, or local universe.

Bruno







Bruno





Simulation - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster ...

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation
a : the imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process by means of the functioning of another <a computer simulation of an industrial process> ...

Definition of EMULATION

1
obsolete : ambitious or envious rivalry
2
: ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement)
3
a : imitation
b : the use of or technique of using an emulator
— em·u·la·tive adjective
— em·u·la·tive·ly adverb


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 17:07:32
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses




On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:



On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal
�
I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
context to any燾alculation, including comp.

Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.


I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing emulation of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are dying of dehydration.

Hi Craig,

Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on the following statements:

- The human brain can be Turing emulated.

I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. Can fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire on the level of the machine itself.

Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in a computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators in the real world.
So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but it is a sculpture.

I see what you mean, but more on that later.
�


- There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human brain and consciousness.


The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately.

Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is necessary.
It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all space but constrained to as single instant of time.

See if my post from last night makes it clearer: 
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/

Interesting post.

You say:�
"In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive personal history."
So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an emulation of my brain?



Craig

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