On Monday, February 4, 2013 5:07:32 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  Hi Bruno Marchal 
>>>>>  
>>>>>  I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
>>>>> context to any calculation, including comp. 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
>>>>> That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is 
>>>> actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not 
>>>> geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing 
>>>> emulation 
>>>> of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of 
>>>> Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we 
>>>> actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are 
>>>> dying of dehydration.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Craig,
>>>
>>> Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on 
>>> the following statements:
>>>
>>> - The human brain can be Turing emulated.
>>>
>>
>> I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. Can 
>> fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the 
>> cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will 
>> work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire 
>> on the level of the machine itself.
>>
>
> Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in a 
> computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators in 
> the real world.
>

Both emulation and simulation are about fulfilling some arbitrary set of 
expectations we have about some target system or object. If my brain 
behaves a certain way, for example, when someone says 'green apple', and I 
think of a particular memory of seeing the iconic label of an immaculate 
black vinyl Beatles album, and I copy that set of brain changes to an 
emulated generic brain which has no Beatles album memory, then it isn't 
going to be likely that when I say "apple" to the emulation, it will 
respond "Beatles" in a free association game. I'm sure that there are a lot 
of brain functions that can be emulated, especially ones lower down on the 
brain stem, but it's still a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
relationship between brain and consciousness which tempts us to think that 
the function of one can be produced by the other.

 
>
>>
>> So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but 
>> it is a sculpture.
>>
>
> I see what you mean, but more on that later.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>> - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human 
>>> brain and consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>> The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human 
>> quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually 
>> the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately.
>>
>
> Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is 
> necessary.
>  
>
>>
>> It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all 
>> time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all 
>> space but constrained to as single instant of time.
>>
>> See if my post from last night makes it clearer: 
>> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/
>>
>
> Interesting post.
>
> You say: 
> "In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives 
> meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive 
> personal history."
>  
> So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an 
> emulation of my brain?
>

It could, but the personal history might have to go back to the beginning 
of the time to be genuine.

Craig
 

>
>
>>
>> Craig
>>
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