On Monday, February 4, 2013 5:07:32 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg > <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >> On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>>>> >>>>> I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive >>>>> context to any calculation, including comp. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable. >>>>> That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is >>>> actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not >>>> geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing >>>> emulation >>>> of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of >>>> Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we >>>> actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are >>>> dying of dehydration. >>>> >>> >>> Hi Craig, >>> >>> Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on >>> the following statements: >>> >>> - The human brain can be Turing emulated. >>> >> >> I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. Can >> fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the >> cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will >> work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire >> on the level of the machine itself. >> > > Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in a > computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators in > the real world. >
Both emulation and simulation are about fulfilling some arbitrary set of expectations we have about some target system or object. If my brain behaves a certain way, for example, when someone says 'green apple', and I think of a particular memory of seeing the iconic label of an immaculate black vinyl Beatles album, and I copy that set of brain changes to an emulated generic brain which has no Beatles album memory, then it isn't going to be likely that when I say "apple" to the emulation, it will respond "Beatles" in a free association game. I'm sure that there are a lot of brain functions that can be emulated, especially ones lower down on the brain stem, but it's still a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between brain and consciousness which tempts us to think that the function of one can be produced by the other. > >> >> So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but >> it is a sculpture. >> > > I see what you mean, but more on that later. > > >> >> >>> - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human >>> brain and consciousness. >>> >>> >> The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human >> quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually >> the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately. >> > > Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is > necessary. > > >> >> It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all >> time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all >> space but constrained to as single instant of time. >> >> See if my post from last night makes it clearer: >> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/ >> > > Interesting post. > > You say: > "In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives > meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive > personal history." > > So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an > emulation of my brain? > It could, but the personal history might have to go back to the beginning of the time to be genuine. Craig > > >> >> Craig >> >>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
