On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 05 Feb 2013, at 14:14, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno, > > The definitons of simulation and emulation I can find both use the word > "imitation". > Can you explain what you mean as being the difference between the two ? > > > A computer can simulate a storm. It can also simulate another computer. In > this case, when we simulate digital events by a digital machine, we can > define a notion of totally faithful simulation. This what is called an > emulation. Some mac, for example, emulate some PC. > In fact any universal machine can emulate all possible digital machinery. > This is why they are said universal. > I would argue that "totally faithful simulation" is not enough. Simulation implies a simulated environment, while emulation has to work in the emulated thing's environment. This is trivial for a mac emulating a PC. It already has a keyboard, a display and a mouse. If you want to emulate fire, it actually has to be able to burn you. Or emulating a complete human being would require a robot. > > Bruno > > > > > > *Simulation* - *Definition* and More from the Free Merriam-Webster > *...*<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation> > www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/*simulation* > a : the *imitative *representation of the functioning of one system or > process by means of the functioning of another <a computer *simulation*of an > industrial process> > *...* > ** > Definition of *EMULATION* > 1 > *obsolete* *:* ambitious or envious rivalry > 2 > *:* ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement) > 3 > *a* *:* *imitation* <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imitation> > *b* *:* the use of or technique of using an > emulator<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emulator> > — *em·u·la·tive* *adjective* > — *em·u·la·tive·ly* *adverb* > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2013-02-04, 17:07:32 > *Subject:* Re: context, comp, and multiverses > > > > > On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>>>> � >>>>> I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive >>>>> context to any燾alculation, including comp. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable. >>>>> That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is >>>> actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not >>>> geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing emulation >>>> of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of >>>> Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we >>>> actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are >>>> dying of dehydration. >>>> >>> >>> Hi Craig, >>> >>> Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on >>> the following statements: >>> >>> - The human brain can be Turing emulated. >>> >> >> I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical reality. Can >> fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it to emulate the >> cooking of emulated food. I can make a single emulation of fire which will >> work for any number of virtual worlds, but none of them can actualize fire >> on the level of the machine itself. >> > > Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a brain in a > computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors and actuators in > the real world. > � > >> >> So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure, but >> it is a sculpture. >> > > I see what you mean, but more on that later. > � > >> >> >>> - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human >>> brain and consciousness. >>> >>> >> The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human >> quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are actually >> the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than privately. >> > > Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no nitpicking is > necessary. > � > >> >> It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through all >> time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal across all >> space but constrained to as single instant of time. >> >> See if my post from last night makes it clearer: >> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/ >> > > Interesting post. > > You say:� > "In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives > meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive > personal history." > � > So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on an > emulation of my brain? > > >> >> Craig >> >>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>> . >>>> � >>>> � >>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> � >> � >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > ____________________________________________________________________ > *DreamMail* - Your mistake not to try it once, but my mistake for your > leaving off. use again www.dreammail.org > <%--DreamMail_AD_END--> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
