On Saturday, February 16, 2013 3:22:36 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, February 15, 2013 6:48:03 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> 
>>> wrote: 
>>>
>>> >> That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there 
>>> must 
>>> >> be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even 
>>> >> with advanced scientific methods. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that 
>>> experience not 
>>> > be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be 
>>> > limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is 
>>> > automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would 
>>> have to 
>>> > be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular 
>>> event 
>>> > from eternity. 
>>>
>>> If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed 
>>> physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is 
>>> something other than a physical basis to the experience. This 
>>> something else is the mysterious non-physical entity. 
>>>
>>
>> No, I'm not saying that at all. I am saying that the idea of something 
>> repeating is a subjective concept. No moment can be repeated. When I was 
>> writing those words, it was a few seconds ago. In that time, the TV show on 
>> in the background has changed, a quantity of snow has fallen in my back 
>> yard, etc. If I say "No moment can be repeated" again, nothing as been 
>> repeated 100%. 
>>
>
> Do you have any theory that explains sensation?
>

Explanation is already a type of sensation. We use explanation to make 
cognitive sense of sensations of other types or of other conceptual 
sensations (thoughts). 
 

>   Does an infinite amount of information go into producing your conscious 
> experience over some finite period of time?
>

Information is not physically real. Formations are representations which 
inform our sensitivity. Our conscious experience is not produced, it is 
presented.
 

>   If not, then it seems plausible that whatever information needs to go 
> into creating some sensory experience can be duplicated.  If it is non 
> infinite then the pigeon hole principle applies ( 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeonhole_principle ).
>

Sensory experience is not created by information, information is a 
consequence of sensory experience and conceptual-level motives. Sensory 
experience is private physics. Information is a conceptual abstraction of 
sensory experience, so that while our thoughts about information are 
physical events, the bits and bytes to which they refer are not physically 
real.

Craig
 

>
> Jason
>
>  
>
>> The repetition arises from our sense to compare remembered experiences 
>> and string them together as similar enough to be considered identical.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> This is equivalent to saying it is 
>>> >> magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a 
>>> >> pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something 
>>> >> else does not change the facts. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, 
>>> so you 
>>> > strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to 
>>> is 
>>> > either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or 
>>> Significance 
>>> > - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing 
>>> else, 
>>> > and I claim nothing else. 
>>>
>>> Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, 
>>
>>
>> No, they are physical, but they are private.
>>  
>>
>>> but the conventional 
>>> view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with 
>>> this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed. 
>>> This would by definition be something magical, like a soul. 
>>>
>>
>> Just the opposite. It is the conventional view which requires a belief in 
>> a magical non-physical never-never land in which our private experience 
>> takes place. Once you realize that the conventional view is impossible, 
>> then you can begin to look for more realistic alternatives based on the 
>> concrete reality of experience rather than the abstract theory based on 
>> measuring interactions of public bodies. I say that every presence is 
>> physical. Thoughts, feelings, dreams, symbols - all physical, all physics. 
>> The relevant distinction within physics should be private time vs public 
>> space, not "real" vs "illusion". 
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> > Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond 
>>> from 
>>> >> > 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the 
>>> universe 
>>> >> > as 
>>> >> > bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique 
>>> variations of 
>>> >> > a 
>>> >> > single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, 
>>> >> > contingent 
>>> >> > upon the experiential capacity of the participant. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be 
>>> >> replicated. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just 
>>> like 
>>> > every experience. 
>>>
>>> If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced 
>>> exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly. 
>>>
>>
>> Experience isn't caused by the brain, any more than the internet is 
>> caused by your computer. Reproducing your computer from 2000 won't 
>> resurrect Napster of 2000. Nothing, and I mean nothing at all has ever been 
>> reproduced exactly.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is* 
>>> >> duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in 
>>> >> extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact 
>>> copy 
>>> >> of anything you care to name. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I 
>>> say, 
>>> > you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally 
>>> > experiences rather than objects. 
>>> > 
>>> > The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on 
>>> sensitivity. If 
>>> > you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the 
>>> Jack of 
>>> > Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you 
>>> factor out 
>>> > sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is 
>>> misconception. 
>>>
>>> Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is 
>>> consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will 
>>> behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original 
>>> have a basic physical existence. 
>>>
>>
>> Behave like the original to whom? There is no way to copy water without 
>> it being water. If I pour sulfuric acid from a pitcher into a water glass, 
>> I might be able to fool someone into thinking that this clear liquid is a 
>> perfect copy, but the smell and the severe chemical burns will reveal that 
>> the copy is actually very different in many other ways. Plants know it, 
>> even inorganic matter will not be fooled. It's only in the visual sense 
>> that the two liquids seem equivalent.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> >> So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen 
>>> if 
>>> >> >> you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science, 
>>> >> > 
>>> >> > 
>>> >> > If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an 
>>> identical 
>>> >> > twin - 
>>> >> > my guess is probably a dead one. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the 
>>> duplication. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you 
>>> clone 
>>> > everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built 
>>> of New 
>>> > York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to 
>>> > communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are 
>>> > disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am 
>>> saying that 
>>> > precisely the opposite is also true. 
>>>
>>> Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with 
>>> each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate 
>>> is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday.
>>
>>
>> No, that's the same pre-affirmation you are smuggling in. If you can't 
>> let go of the certainty that the public shapes of the brain define 
>> experience, then you won't ever locate experience at all. Our brain is 
>> necessary but not sufficient to explain human quality of consciousness, 
>> just as a TV set is necessary but not sufficient to explain Spongebob 
>> Squarepants. We aren't inside our brain, we are inside our lifetime.
>>
>> If 
>>> something goes wrong in the copying process, like a head injury, you 
>>> might forget how to do these things. 
>>>
>>
>> There are no identical twins who are the same person, even when they 
>> share the same body.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you 
>>> >> survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using 
>>> >> inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are. 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > Because you aren't cells, you are the experiences of cells, molecules, 
>>> > organs, people, civilizations. The cells are like the fuel which 
>>> experience 
>>> > burns. "Copying" is an intersubjective relation. It just means that in 
>>> our 
>>> > particular state of mind two things seem identical. 
>>>
>>> But if you copy the cells you reproduce the experience, and if you 
>>> don't then something is missing. 
>>>
>>
>> No, you can't reproduce anything. Not a cell, not an experience. It is a 
>> figurative term; an expectation of local consciousness that has no absolute 
>> truth to it. 
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou 
>>>
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