On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):

We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and doubly so!

I don't think we know that.

Hi Bruno,

    Of course "we don't know that for sure"... you are being ridiculous !

This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.

Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with a proof, for your idea of "we know that". I understand...

The same is true for the proposition "we are not machine".

    Is not p, of Bp&p, a hypothesis as well?

Stephen P. King wrote (to me):

But neither Bp nor Bp & p are ontological. Only p is is.

    Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is ontological?

I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...}, with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.

p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological as opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting means "believed by some machine", and which I denote by Bp. Of course, and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely arithmetical proposition (beweisbar("p")), but they are epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition coded in the machine language.

When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which describes the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical proposition with their usual standard interpretation). Then some arithmetical proposition are singled out as epistemological because they describe:
- the "thinking" of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp & p, or the observation of some machine like Bp & Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp & Dt & p.

See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I don't want to be long.

I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is limited.

That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age 7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing how a digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew already, in some (platonic) sense.

You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have questions for you to answer...

Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong. I have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd comment. I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely said. This include children.

But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you demonstrate above.

Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer should be astonished.

OK. "Human are relative universal number by comp..." Could you add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean? Relative to what?

Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that we assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing the combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or -relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to the base theory, or -relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.

Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers? Consider how many different languages humans use to describe the same physical world, we would think it silly if someone made claims that only English was the 'correct' language. So too with mathematics.

You attribute to me the idea that chalkboard don't exist. Did I ever said that?

   UDA Step 8.

Many others have already told you this many times. UDA step 8 concludes that chalkboard does not exist in a primary sense. Not that chalkboard does not exist in the observable sense.

OK, my point is that just as the chalkboard emerges so too do the possible arithmetic representations of said chalkboard. They are co-dependent in my dual aspect theory. I do not understand how you explain the emergence of the chalkboard except to refer to a vague "arithmetic body problem'.

That would instantaneously refutes comp. The conclusion is that physics is not the fundamental science, and that it is reduced to arithmetic. Not that physics is non sense. OIn the contrary, with comp we see how a physical reality, even a quantum one, is unavoidable for almost all universal numbers.

    Yes, but can we try to restate this in a different form?

Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not logically inconsistent with consciousness.

I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics that a system cannot semantically act upon itself.

? (that seems to contradict comp, and be rather 1004)

You do not seem consider the need to error correct and adapt to changing local conditions for a conscious machine nor the need to maintain access to low entropy resources. Your machines are never hungry.

Take the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky way at the level of strings, with 10^1000 decimals. Its evolution is emulated by infinitely many arithmetical relation, and in all of them a lot of machines are hungry, and many lack resources, and other do not. Now, such computation might not have the right first person indeterminacy measure, but in this case comp is false, and if someone show that he will refute comp. But in all case, arithmetic handle all relative resources. So you it seems that you are not correct here.

I think that the measure is determined locally by the number of machines that get fed versus the total number of possible machines that could be implemented in that location, very vaguely speaking.



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