On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):
We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and
doubly so!
I don't think we know that.
Hi Bruno,
Of course "we don't know that for sure"... you are being
ridiculous !
This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.
Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with a
proof, for your idea of "we know that". I understand...
The same is true for the proposition "we are not machine".
Is not p, of Bp&p, a hypothesis as well?
Yes. But not at the same level.
Stephen P. King wrote (to me):
But neither Bp nor Bp & p are ontological. Only p is is.
Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is
ontological?
I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...},
with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.
p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base
level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological as
opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting means
"believed by some machine", and which I denote by Bp. Of course,
and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely
arithmetical proposition (beweisbar("p")), but they are
epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition
coded in the machine language.
When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which describes
the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical proposition
with their usual standard interpretation). Then some arithmetical
proposition are singled out as epistemological because they describe:
- the "thinking" of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp & p, or the observation of
some machine like Bp & Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp & Dt & p.
See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the
corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I
don't want to be long.
I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision
has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is
limited.
That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age
7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing how
a digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew
already, in some (platonic) sense.
You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have
questions for you to answer...
???
Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong. I
have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd
comment.
I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely
said. This include children.
But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you
demonstrate above.
On the contrary. Children uses plain language. You give always too
much precise answer but with a non relevant precision. Here you were
just wrong, but no matter how we try to make the point, you will evade
it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or on opinion assertion, making hard
to progress.
Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal
number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer
should be astonished.
OK. "Human are relative universal number by comp..." Could you
add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean?
Relative to what?
Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that we
assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing the
combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or
-relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to
the base theory, or
-relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal
number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.
Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be
seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers?
Which isomorphisms?
Consider how many different languages humans use to describe the
same physical world, we would think it silly if someone made claims
that only English was the 'correct' language. So too with mathematics.
You confuse the content of mathematics and the language used. The
mathematical reality has nothing to do with language.
You attribute to me the idea that chalkboard don't exist. Did I
ever said that?
UDA Step 8.
Many others have already told you this many times. UDA step 8
concludes that chalkboard does not exist in a primary sense. Not
that chalkboard does not exist in the observable sense.
OK, my point is that just as the chalkboard emerges so too do the
possible arithmetic representations of said chalkboard.
That could make sense if you put the card on the table, and tell what
you are assuming, and how the numbers emerge from it. But it is has
been proved that it has to be Turing equivalent, and so the base
theory will just be another Turing universal system. I use arithmetic
because people are already familiar with it.
They are co-dependent in my dual aspect theory.
We don't use theory in the same sense. I have not yet seen a theory,
in the usual sense of theory.
I do not understand how you explain the emergence of the chalkboard
except to refer to a vague "arithmetic body problem'.
That's the whole object of my work and my post here. Physics is given
by the S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* logic. But even without AUDA, the origin of
physics is entirely explained by the first person indeterminacy on the
computations. And the explanation makes clear why it separates into
qualia and quanta. You don't need to believe in comp to understand the
theory.
That would instantaneously refutes comp. The conclusion is that
physics is not the fundamental science, and that it is reduced to
arithmetic. Not that physics is non sense. OIn the contrary, with
comp we see how a physical reality, even a quantum one, is
unavoidable for almost all universal numbers.
Yes, but can we try to restate this in a different form?
Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not
logically inconsistent with consciousness.
I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical
mechanics that a system cannot semantically act upon itself.
? (that seems to contradict comp, and be rather 1004)
You do not seem consider the need to error correct and adapt to
changing local conditions for a conscious machine nor the need to
maintain access to low entropy resources. Your machines are never
hungry.
Take the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky way at the level of
strings, with 10^1000 decimals. Its evolution is emulated by
infinitely many arithmetical relation, and in all of them a lot of
machines are hungry, and many lack resources, and other do not.
Now, such computation might not have the right first person
indeterminacy measure, but in this case comp is false, and if
someone show that he will refute comp. But in all case, arithmetic
handle all relative resources. So you it seems that you are not
correct here.
I think that the measure is determined locally by the number of
machines that get fed versus the total number of possible machines
that could be implemented in that location, very vaguely speaking.
You escape again the point made.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
