On 3/10/2013 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Mar 2013, at 09:31, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/10/2013 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Mar 2013, at 21:37, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/9/2013 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Stephen P. King wrote (to Alberto Corona):

We are machines, very sophisticated, but machines nonetheless and doubly so!

I don't think we know that.

Hi Bruno,

Of course "we don't know that for sure"... you are being ridiculous !

This can only be an hypothesis, or a consequence of an hypothesis.

Yes, of course. We can only have certainty within a theory with a proof, for your idea of "we know that". I understand...

The same is true for the proposition "we are not machine".

   Is not p, of Bp&p, a hypothesis as well?

Yes. But not at the same level.
Hi Bruno,

    OK, what generates or requires the stratification into levels?

To ask a machine about herself (like in self-duplication experiences), you need to represent the machine in the language available to the machine. This generates the stratification.

This in not ontic as it implies an extension, as in: Machine X is represented by machine X' which is represented by machine X'' which is represented by ... And, some how X does not equal X """"""""""""""....

Stephen P. King wrote (to me):

But neither Bp nor Bp & p are ontological. Only p is is.

Could you make a mental note to elaborate on how p is ontological?

I have fixed the base ontology with N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...}, with the usual successor, + and * axioms/laws.

p is used for an arbitrary arithmetical proposition, at that base level, with its usual standard interpretation. It is ontological as opposed to epistemological proposition, which in this setting means "believed by some machine", and which I denote by Bp. Of course, and that is what comp makes possible, Bp is also a purely arithmetical proposition (beweisbar("p")), but they are epistemological because they involve a machine, and a proposition coded in the machine language.

When I write p, I allude to the arithmetical truth, which describes the ontology chosen (the numbers, and the arithmetical proposition with their usual standard interpretation). Then some arithmetical proposition are singled out as epistemological because they describe:
- the "thinking" of some machine, like Bp, or
- the knowledge of some machine, like Bp & p, or the observation of some machine like Bp & Dt, or
- the feeling of some machine like Bp & Dt & p.

See my papers for the precise morphisms, and the derivation of the corresponding logics and mathematics. Or ask further question. I don't want to be long.

I wish that you could speak vaguely with us and be OK. Precision has its place and time but not here when our time to respond is limited.

That's why I have done UDA, for all good willing humans, from age 7 to 77, and AUDA, for all digital machines and humans knowing how a digital machine work. Of course, the digital machine knew already, in some (platonic) sense.

You seem sometimes to forget that the children also have questions for you to answer...

Why do you ever make statements like that. Nothing is more wrong. I have no clue why you make such ad hominem and completely absurd comment. I love answer all genuine question, from 7 to 77, I just precisely said. This include children.

But you demand too much exactness in a response, as you demonstrate above.

On the contrary. Children uses plain language.

No, they use naive language. They do not assume that they know what they do not know.

And you do?

How could I? Why do you think that if I do not know exactly the language to answer your question then I must be some ...

You give always too much precise answer but with a non relevant precision. Here you were just wrong, but no matter how we try to make the point, you will evade it by a 1004 move, an allusion, or on opinion assertion, making hard to progress.

You are claiming that my question is incoherent. OK, let us move along.

No, I was claiming that you were wrong. You said I don't take into account children, but I do. AUDA can be said to take into account all creatures, or all Löbian consistent extensions of elementary arithmetic.

So, I am not a creature included here, somehow, and yet my existence is not a falsification of comp. Interesting, I am deluded about being deluded about being deluded about being ... .

Human can choose by themselves. Human are relative universal number by comp, even without step 8. Only a non-comp believer should be astonished.

OK. "Human are relative universal number by comp..." Could you add more detail to this answer? What is the 'relative' word mean? Relative to what?

Either (according to the context):
-relative to the base theory (the starting universal system that we assume. I have chosen arithmetic (after an attempt of chosing the combinators, but people are less familiar with them), or -relative to a universal number, which is universal relatively to the base theory, or -relative to a universal number, which is relative to a universal number, which is relative to the base theory, etc.

Fine, could you consider how the general pattern of this can be seen in the isomorphisms of universal numbers?

Which isomorphisms?

Relations between universal numbers that are equivalences. For example, the universal number that encodes the statement X in language B is isomorphic to the statement X in language A, iff B(X) = A(X) ...

Either you explain your point in plain language, or if you use a mathematical term, you explain it in standard math. The way you mix them makes it not understandable for layman, and non sensical to mathematicians.

I have the written equivalent of a stutter. Can you try to comprehend that? Try harder to understand me. But why is it that I understand comp perfectly, such that I understand how it is correct and has an arithmetic body problem and ...

Consider how many different languages humans use to describe the same physical world, we would think it silly if someone made claims that only English was the 'correct' language. So too with mathematics.

You confuse the content of mathematics and the language used. The mathematical reality has nothing to do with language.

    No, that is not my sin.


My sin is that I do not know exactly now to communicate in your language.

You attribute to me the idea that chalkboard don't exist. Did I ever said that?

  UDA Step 8.

Many others have already told you this many times. UDA step 8 concludes that chalkboard does not exist in a primary sense. Not that chalkboard does not exist in the observable sense.

OK, my point is that just as the chalkboard emerges so too do the possible arithmetic representations of said chalkboard.

That could make sense if you put the card on the table, and tell what you are assuming, and how the numbers emerge from it.

You are actually asking that I know what to write before I have the ability to write that you want me to write so that you can understand my thoughts. Nice burden to place upon me!

*You* write something. If you don't know what you want to write, don't write, until you know.

So I should be happy to remain ignorant and curious or better, incurious of the body problem? No, never! Not ever!

But it is has been proved that it has to be Turing equivalent, and so the base theory will just be another Turing universal system. I use arithmetic because people are already familiar with it.

How, exactly is the claim "has it (all physical implementations of comp) been proved that it has to be Turing equivalent" falsifiable? It requires that we examine every possible physical world without any guidance of what a "physical world" might be!

This shows perhaps only that we should not even start assuming a physical reality. We don't know if that exists (primarily), we have never suggest a way to test it, and it brings unnecessary difficulties.

Why is that? I don't have to 'assume any physical reality' at all. It smashes me in the face every morning when I wake up. I don't have a choice!

They are co-dependent in my dual aspect theory.

We don't use theory in the same sense. I have not yet seen a theory, in the usual sense of theory.


So I fail to see what you mean. That would not be a problem, except that you do assert some amount of dissatisfaction with either comp or its consequence, and you invoke a theory to explain this, but you don't show the theory. What can I do for helping?

Explain to me why are numbers more "real" than any physical collection that is representable by some number? This would be a good reason why numbers carry more ontic weight and necessity than a physical object.

I do not understand how you explain the emergence of the chalkboard except to refer to a vague "arithmetic body problem'.

That's the whole object of my work and my post here. Physics is given by the S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* logic. But even without AUDA, the origin of physics is entirely explained by the first person indeterminacy on the computations.

No! An 'explanation' is not an explanation unless an arbitrarily large number of observers can agree that the model of the theory is experienced by them, i.e. that it is 'real'.

Up to now, comp gives the quantum physics, so that is the case that the theory is experienced by the observers.

How? You have not shown why observables by multiple observers must be mutually exclusive in most instances of a pair of observers. I claim that it is not possible to prove this because there exists a pair of ontological entities for any level where distinctions between them is possible.

And the explanation makes clear why it separates into qualia and quanta.


I have explained this already. By the 1p that we got from the "& p" intensional variants + the spliiting between justifiable and true that we obtained from the splitting between G and G* intensional variant. We get a complete explanation why machines distinguishes truth that they can access and relation between beliefs that they can justify.

OK, we do not disagree on those points, but we have not agreed on what it means for a given machine to communicate its belief to another.

You don't need to believe in comp to understand the theory.


You don't need to believe (as true) in any theory to understand that theory. You need only to believe it as an hypothesis.

I don't care about what I believe, I care about what I can communicate with you and with LizR and with John and with Craig and with Bill and with the moon, and with the electron in the Andromeda galaxy and with ...

That would instantaneously refutes comp. The conclusion is that physics is not the fundamental science, and that it is reduced to arithmetic. Not that physics is non sense. OIn the contrary, with comp we see how a physical reality, even a quantum one, is unavoidable for almost all universal numbers.

   Yes, but can we try to restate this in a different form?

Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not logically inconsistent with consciousness.

I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics that a system cannot semantically act upon itself.

? (that seems to contradict comp, and be rather 1004)

You do not seem consider the need to error correct and adapt to changing local conditions for a conscious machine nor the need to maintain access to low entropy resources. Your machines are never hungry.

Take the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky way at the level of strings, with 10^1000 decimals. Its evolution is emulated by infinitely many arithmetical relation, and in all of them a lot of machines are hungry, and many lack resources, and other do not. Now, such computation might not have the right first person indeterminacy measure, but in this case comp is false, and if someone show that he will refute comp. But in all case, arithmetic handle all relative resources. So you it seems that you are not correct here.

I think that the measure is determined locally by the number of machines that get fed versus the total number of possible machines that could be implemented in that location, very vaguely speaking.

You escape again the point made.

I escape purposely. I have learned from the best escape artists! The emulation of the Milky way (with 10^1000 decimals) demands a specific quantity of resources to be run.

Yes, but that is the kind of resources that is free in arithmetic. It is not a physical resource.

Then why is it that computations require computers to be plugged in to give answers. By your account we should expect all stones to speak truths! No need for a resource of time and memory or low entropy energy.

This is not philosophy! In physics there is an upper bound on the quantity of computations that can occur in a given space-time hyper volume: Bekenstein's bound <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bekenstein_bound>. This is ignored in Platonism.

Because the goal is in explaining physics.

I don't need to explain physics, I experience a physical world first hand. I need to explain how it is that some mind is so stubborn to no wish to comprehend why it needs a body to have a conversation with me. I am, after all, only an infinite number of computations in your definitions...

You said yourself that physics is not primitive, but you keep referring to physical statements to criticize a theory which does not assume, and cannot assume physics. That is not consistent.

It is only inconsistent to believe that numbers can be ontologically primitive and physical worlds cannot be. I say that neither numbers nor physical worlds can be ontologically primitive thus I am not inconsistent.



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