On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts
>> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter
>> of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most
>> commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted.
> I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and
> incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of
> free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms of
> categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand and
> there can never be any definition beyond that experience.

If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are
an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try
to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology?

>> And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or
>> frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How
>> are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with
>> theirs?
> I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to
> buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own
> communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, everyone
> will have the definition which has been determined for them by circumstance.

It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for
consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this
then there is not much point in further debate.

Stathis Papaioannou

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