On 30 Mar 2013, at 02:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, March 29, 2013 1:59:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2013, at 16:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, March 29, 2013 10:47:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2013, at 10:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/3/29 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
On 28 Mar 2013, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2013 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question
of "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough
heat while young, something like that. It is close to courage, and
it is what make competence possible.
??
Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on
transfinite lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for
necessary long work, and can have negative feedback on intelligence.
That sounds like a quibble. Intelligence is usually just thought
of as the the ability to learn competence over a very general
domain.
That's why I think that intelligence is simple, almost a mental
attitude, more akin to courage and humility, than anything else.
Competence asks for gift or work, and can often lead to the
feeling that we are more intelligent than others, which is the
first basic symptom of stupidity.
That sounds more and more "1984"ish... War is peace.
?
Freedom is slavery.
?
Ignorance is strength
I never said that.
I say that awareness of our ignorance is strength. It participates
to our intelligence.
That is true only if our intelligence is grounded in something
which transcends its own ignorance...
That's what the Löbian machines do, even just by looking inward.
That's computer science.
They question their ignorance or the question their certainty?
They contemplate their ignorance, and use it to question their
certainty.
otherwise awareness of our own ignorance is just another layer of
ignorance. This carries over to simulation - the ability to discern
one thing as more real than another is meaningless unless our sense
of realism is grounded in something beyond simulation.
Right. The physical reality, with comp, is not simulable. Nor
consciousness.
Then what are we saying yes to the doctor for?
For an artificial brain, which will hopefully simulate their organic
brain at the right level, so that they keep the usual statistical
relationship with their usual universal neighbors (the physical
universe, their boss, their life partners, etc.).
But machines can makes possible for some person to manifest
themselves with some other person, with some non negligible
probability.
?
This is what you might understand if you read carefully UDA, at least
up to step 7.
Patterns don't care about patterns, or to quote Deleuze -
“Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference.
Representation has only a single center, a unique and receding
perspective, and in the consequence a false depth. It mediates
everything, but mobilizes and moves nothing."
That makes sense in comp when describing the machine first person
perspective.
How is it different in a third person perspective? How do
computations discern between hypothesis and mobilization, or more
importantly, how do they move anything?
Because they have faith in their ability to move something, which they
develop through lasting and repeating true experiences.
In some sense we might argue that the first person associated to a
machine, is not really a machine, after all, nor anything
describable in any 3p way.
Which invites the question, in what way can comp claim to address
consciousness? How does the 1p interface with the 3p?
By the reinstallation of the connection/conjunction with truth. It
associates an unnameable knower to a nameable believer.
And that is what makes the first person immune for diagonalization,
making it possible that [] x -> x. "[]" is not a number. Provably so
with []p = Bp & p.
What makes the first person feel?
Their knowledge.
Comp is not so much "I am a machine" that "I (whatever I am) can
survive locally with "normal probability" a digital brain/body
transplant". What is saved in the process is an immaterial
connection between some number, some environments or consistent
computational-continuations, and an infinity of universal numbers".
If we don't know what "I" is, then we really can't pretend to know
whether it is automatically transferred from location to location
simply by an affinity of signs and functions.
We never know what things are, and that's why we assume theories,
reason, and test them.
public nature never say that you are correct. It can only say that you
are wrong.
In comp only God can tell you that you are correct, but if you repeat
that, then you are wrong.
We are not machines, Craig, we borrow machines (arithmetical
relations). We are living on the boundaries between the computable
and the non computable.
I can agree with that, but I go further to say that what machines
are is actually the poorest possible reflection of our nature.
That's your usual prejudice on numbers and machine, which from inside
is far vaster than nature and cosmoses.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
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