On Friday, March 29, 2013 1:59:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Mar 2013, at 16:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 29, 2013 10:47:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 29 Mar 2013, at 10:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2013/3/29 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> >>> >>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 3/28/2013 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of >>>>> "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while >>>>> young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make >>>>> competence possible. >>>>> >>>> >>>> ?? >>>> >>>> >>>>> Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on >>>>> transfinite lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary >>>>> long work, and can have negative feedback on intelligence. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That sounds like a quibble. Intelligence is usually just thought of as >>>> the the ability to learn competence over a very general domain. >>>> >>> >>> That's why I think that intelligence is simple, almost a mental >>> attitude, more akin to courage and humility, than anything else. >>> Competence asks for gift or work, and can often lead to the feeling that >>> we are more intelligent than others, which is the first basic symptom of >>> stupidity. >>> >>> >> That sounds more and more "1984"ish... War is peace. >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> Freedom is slavery. >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> Ignorance is strength >> >> >> I never said that. >> >> I say that awareness of our ignorance is strength. It participates to our >> intelligence. >> > > That is true only if our intelligence is grounded in something which > transcends its own ignorance... > > > That's what the Löbian machines do, even just by looking inward. That's > computer science. >
They question their ignorance or the question their certainty? > > > > > otherwise awareness of our own ignorance is just another layer of > ignorance. This carries over to simulation - the ability to discern one > thing as more real than another is meaningless unless our sense of realism > is grounded in something beyond simulation. > > > Right. The physical reality, with comp, is not simulable. Nor > consciousness. > Then what are we saying yes to the doctor for? > But machines can makes possible for some person to manifest themselves > with some other person, with some non negligible probability. > ? > > > > > > Patterns don't care about patterns, or to quote Deleuze - “Representation > fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only > a single center, a unique and receding perspective, and in the consequence > a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilizes and moves nothing." > > > That makes sense in comp when describing the machine first person > perspective. > How is it different in a third person perspective? How do computations discern between hypothesis and mobilization, or more importantly, how do they move anything? > > In some sense we might argue that the first person associated to a > machine, is not really a machine, after all, nor anything describable in > any 3p way. > Which invites the question, in what way can comp claim to address consciousness? How does the 1p interface with the 3p? > > And that is what makes the first person immune for diagonalization, making > it possible that [] x -> x. "[]" is not a number. Provably so with []p = Bp > & p. > What makes the first person feel? > > Comp is not so much "I am a machine" that "I (whatever I am) can survive > locally with "normal probability" a digital brain/body transplant". What is > saved in the process is an immaterial connection between some number, some > environments or consistent computational-continuations, and an infinity of > universal numbers". > If we don't know what "I" is, then we really can't pretend to know whether it is automatically transferred from location to location simply by an affinity of signs and functions. > > We are not machines, Craig, we borrow machines (arithmetical relations). > We are living on the boundaries between the computable and the non > computable. > I can agree with that, but I go further to say that what machines are is actually the poorest possible reflection of our nature. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
