On Friday, March 29, 2013 1:59:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Mar 2013, at 16:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>
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> On Friday, March 29, 2013 10:47:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Mar 2013, at 10:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
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>>
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>> 2013/3/29 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 3/28/2013 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of 
>>>>> "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while 
>>>>> young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make 
>>>>> competence possible.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ??
>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>> Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on 
>>>>> transfinite  lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary 
>>>>> long work, and can have negative feedback on intelligence.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That sounds like a quibble.  Intelligence is usually just thought of as 
>>>> the the ability to learn competence over a very general domain.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's why I think that intelligence is simple, almost a mental 
>>> attitude, more akin to courage and humility, than anything else.
>>> Competence asks for gift or work, and can often lead to the feeling that 
>>> we are more intelligent than others, which is the first basic symptom of 
>>> stupidity.
>>>
>>>
>> That sounds more and more "1984"ish... War is peace. 
>>
>>
>> ?
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>>
>>
>> Freedom is slavery.
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>>
>>
>> Ignorance is strength 
>>
>>
>> I never said that.
>>
>> I say that awareness of our ignorance is strength. It participates to our 
>> intelligence.
>>
>
> That is true only if our intelligence is grounded in something which 
> transcends its own ignorance...
>
>
> That's what the Löbian machines do, even just by looking inward. That's 
> computer science.
>

They question their ignorance or the question their certainty?
 

>
>
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> otherwise awareness of our own ignorance is just another layer of 
> ignorance. This carries over to simulation - the ability to discern one 
> thing as more real than another is meaningless unless our sense of realism 
> is grounded in something beyond simulation. 
>
>
> Right. The physical reality, with comp, is not simulable. Nor 
> consciousness. 
>

Then what are we saying yes to the doctor for?
 

> But machines can makes possible for some person to manifest themselves 
> with some other person, with some non negligible probability.
>

?
 

>
>
>
>
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> Patterns don't care about patterns, or to quote Deleuze - “Representation 
> fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only 
> a single center, a unique and receding perspective, and in the consequence 
> a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilizes and moves nothing."
>
>
> That makes sense in comp when describing the machine first person 
> perspective. 
>

How is it different in a third person perspective? How do computations 
discern between hypothesis and mobilization, or more importantly, how do 
they move anything?
 

>
> In some sense we might argue that the first person associated to a 
> machine, is not really a machine, after all, nor anything describable in 
> any 3p way. 
>

Which invites the question, in what way can comp claim to address 
consciousness? How does the 1p interface with the 3p?
 

>
> And that is what makes the first person immune for diagonalization, making 
> it possible that [] x -> x. "[]" is not a number. Provably so with []p = Bp 
> & p. 
>

What makes the first person feel?
 

>
> Comp is not so much "I am a machine" that "I (whatever I am) can survive 
> locally with "normal probability" a digital brain/body transplant". What is 
> saved in the process is an immaterial connection between some number, some 
> environments or consistent computational-continuations, and an infinity of 
> universal numbers". 
>

If we don't know what "I" is, then we really can't pretend to know whether 
it is automatically transferred from location to location simply by an 
affinity of signs and functions.
 

>
> We are not machines, Craig, we borrow machines (arithmetical relations). 
> We are living on the boundaries between the computable and the non 
> computable.
>

I can agree with that, but I go further to say that what machines are is 
actually the poorest possible reflection of our nature.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
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>

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