On 28 Mar 2013, at 19:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


On 26 Mar 2013, at 18:19, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/26/2013 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough
reflexivity,
then the machine can already understand that she cannot justify
rationally
the presence of its experience. No machine, nor us, can ever see how that
could be true. It *is* in the range of the non communicable.

If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find any
test
to prove them wrong.


And if we decide the Mars Rover is conscious, can any test prove us
wrong?


Yes. But it is longer to explain than for comp. Strong AI is refutable in
a
weaker sense than comp. The refutation here are indirect and based on the
acceptance of the classical tgeory of knowledge, that is S4 (not
necessarily
Theaetetus).



Or if Craig decides an atom is conscious, can any test prove him wrong?


A person can be conscious. What would it mean that an atom is conscious?
What is an atom?



Davies suggests that the threshold for consciousness based on the
Lloyd limit is the complexity of the human cell.


In which physics?

Holographic (Bekenstein bound) physics of 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit)

If he assumes comp, he must derive that physics first, to
get a valid consequences.

Davies does not assume comp. I thought I did in my paper.

BTW I don't see the use of comp in your paper.

I certainly discuss physics derived from comp in my paper
(http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194) while leaving out all the math
details.
ie. CY manifolds->math->mind/physics-> matter

Could you expand when you have time how I do not use comp?

If you study sane04, you should easily be convinced by yourself. It is more like:

Numbers => machine's mind-psychology/theology => physics




What I do is to place resource limits on comp
(10^120 bits for the universe and perhaps 10^1000 for the Metaverse).
Is that perhaps what you refer to?

Which means that you assume a notion of physical resource at the start, but this can't work.
That is what I explain on this list since a long time.





Or is it the conjecture that CY manifolds are the comp machine,

That might be correct. In that case the CY should be derived from the "intelligible matter" hypostases.



one for the universe and another for the metaverse?
Thanks for reading the paper.

Unfortunately I am not so knowledgeable in string theory. It is interesting, but assuming it might hide the distinction quanta/qualia. It is still physics, and that's the problem here, somehow.

Best,

Bruno




Richard


Now, I can accept that human cells have already some consciousness. Even bacteria. I dunno but I am open to the idea. Bacteria have already full Turing universality, and exploit it in complex genetic regulation control.

Comp is open with a strict Moore law: the number of angels (or bit
processing) that you can put at the top of a needle might be unbounded. Like Feynman said, there is room in the bottom. But we might have insuperable read and write problems. There might be computer in which we can upload our
minds, but never came back.

Bruno








Which I think is John Clark's point: Consciousness is easy. Intelligence
is
hard.



Consciousness might be more easy than intelligence, and certainly than matter. Consciousness is easy with UDA, when you get the difference
between
both G and G*, and between Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc. (AUDA).

Matter is more difficult. Today we have only the propositional
observable.

Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of
"abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make
competence possible.

Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on transfinite lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary long work,
and
can have negative feedback on intelligence.

Bruno






Brent

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