On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:08:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes < >>>>>> te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg >>>>>>> <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the >>>>>>>> winning Arimaa mappings? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical >>>>>>> computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we >>>>>>> don't >>>>>>> have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is >>>>>>> why >>>>>>> on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's >>>>>>> too >>>>>>> complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. >>>>>>> Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, >>>>>>> which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: >>>>>> >>>>>> If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were >>>>>> computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of >>>>>> synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of >>>>>> the >>>>>> total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not >>>>>> needed >>>>>> to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with >>>>>> fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved >>>>> survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological >>>>> investment pay off. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human >>>> intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when >>>> the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more >>>> computations than even the largest super computers of today. >>>> >>> >>> Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone >>> >> >> I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. >> > > What else are you suggesting makes the difference? > > To implement human learning an intelligence we need the right algorithm and sufficient computational power to implement it. > >> >> >>> can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience >>> which compares to that of an animal. >>> >> >> Both are made of the same four fundamental forces interacting with each >> other, why should the number of protons in the nucleus of some atoms in >> those organic molecules make any difference to the subject? >> > > Why does arsenic have a different effect on the body than sugar? Different > forms signify different possibilities and potentials on many different > levels. The number of protons causes some things on some levels by virtue > of its topological potentials, but that is not the cause of order in the > the cosmos, or awareness. Gold could be any number of protons in a nucleus, > it just happens to be using that configuration, just like the ip address of > a website does not determine its content. > If your theory is that sense is primitive then how do you justify your belief that certain materials are associated with certain possibilities of experience? > > > >> What led you to chose the chemical elements as the origin of sense and >> feeling, as opposed to higher level structures (neurology, circuits, etc.) >> or lower level structures (quarks, gluons, electrons)? >> > > The chemical elements have nothing to do with the origin of sense and > feeling at all, just like the letters of the alphabet have nothing to do > with the origin of Shakespeare. Shakespeare used words, words are made of > certain combinations of letters and not others, which is what makes them > words. > Exactly, I just think the alphabet for spelling different conscious states exists at a lower level than you do, e.g., in the logic of recursive relationships, rather than in atomic elements. > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. >>>>> >>>> >>>> A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are >>>> not possible. >>>> >>> >>> That's begging the question. >>> >> >> Not quite, I provided an argument for my reasoning. >> > > If your argument is A = B because B = A then you are still begging the > question. > You are arguing it is possible to see without seeing, which I equate with zombies, and which I think is logically inconsistent. It is a proof by contradiction that shows it is not possible to "see without seeing". > > > >> What is your objection, that zombies are possible, or that zombies are >> not possible but that doesn't mean something that in all ways appears >> conscious must be conscious? >> > > My objection is that the premise of zombies is broken to begin with. > We agree on this. So then isn't the premise of some life form behaving as though it can see, while being blind not broken to begin with? > It asks the wrong question and makes the wrong assumption about > consciousness. There is no 'in all ways appears'...it is always 'in all > ways appears to X under Y circumstance. > Maybe that's just how it appears to you. ;-) > > >> >> >>> Anything that is not exactly what it we might assume it is would be a >>> 'zombie' to some extent. A human does not have to be aware to do the things >>> that it does, which is proved by blindsight, sleepwalking, brainwashing, >>> etc. A human may, in reality, have to be aware to perform all of the >>> functions that we do, but if comp were true, that would not be the case. >>> >>> >>>> Your examples of blind sight are not a disproof of the separability >>>> of function and awareness, >>>> >>> >>> I understand why you think that, but ultimately it is proof of exactly >>> that. >>> >>> >>>> only examples of broken links in communication (quite similar to split >>>> brain patients). >>>> >>> >>> A broken link in communication which prevents you from being aware of >>> the experience which is informing you is the same thing as function being >>> separate from awareness. The end result is that it is not necessary to >>> experience any conscious qualia to receive optical information. There is no >>> difference functionally between a "broken link in communication" and >>> "separability of function and awareness". The awareness is broken in the >>> dead link, but the function is retained, thus they are in fact separate. >>> >> >> So you take the split brain patient's word for it that he didn't see the >> word "PAN" flashed on the screen http://www.youtube.com/watch?** >> v=ZMLzP1VCANo&t=1m50s<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMLzP1VCANo&t=1m50s> >> > > He didn't see it at the personal level, no. He saw it on a sub-personal > level. > I would argue there are two persons, one that sees it and another that doesn't. This has been demonstrated by some rare split brain patients which had verbal abilities in both hemispheres, this allowed each hemisphere to be interviewed independently. See: http://www.macalester.edu/psychology/whathap/ubnrp/split_brain/Behavior.html > > >> >> Perhaps his left hemisphere didn't see it, but his right hemisphere >> certainly did, as his right hemisphere is able to draw a picture of that >> pan (something in his brain saw it). >> > > Right. Technically I would say that the hemisphere doesn't see anything, > but rather he sees through his sub-personal agents which are associated > with a hemisphere. > > >> >> I can't experience life through your eyes right now because our brains >> are disconnected, should you take my word for my assertion that you must >> not be experiencing anything because the I in Jason's skull doesn't >> experience any visual stimulus from Craig's eyes? >> > > I would if not for my own experience which contradicts your belief and is > not possible for me to deny. > But who would believe you if you were mute and trapped inside my skull, how would anyone know you are still there? > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> There are a lot of neurons in our gut as well, and assimilation of >>>>> nutrients is undoubtedly complex and important to survival, yet we are not >>>>> compelled to insist that there must be some conscious experience to manage >>>>> that intelligence. Learning is complex, but awareness itself is simple. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think the nerves in the gut can manifest as awareness, such as >>>> cravings for certain foods when the body realizes it is deficient in some >>>> particular nutrient. Afterall, what is the point of all those nerves if >>>> they have no impact on behavior? >>>> >>> >>> Oh I agree, because my view is panexperiential. The gut doesn't have the >>> kind of awareness that a human being has as a whole, because the other >>> organs of the body are not as significant as the brain is to the organism. >>> If we are going by the comp assumption though, then there is an implication >>> that nothing has any awareness unless it is running a very sophisticated >>> program. >>> >>> >> I don't think that belief is universal. Bruno thinks even simple Turing >> machines are conscious, and many people debate whether thermostats can be >> considered at some level conscious. I am partial to the idea that >> awareness of even a single bit of information represents an atom of >> awareness. But I, unlike you, think that complex sensations require >> complex representations. I think we agree there is no set complexity >> threshold where the magic of consciousness begins. >> > > I would say that complex sensations (presentations) are associated with > complex representations, but they don't cause them. The complexity of > presentations and representations contribute to each others complexity and > allow both to become more elaborate, but in an ultimate sense, the > presentation is driving the complexity rather than the other way around. > That's perhaps not too far from Bruno's explanation of what happens when a person views their own brain scan. It is their own complex experience which leads to probable explanations such as complex histories of evolution, and complex maps of neurons to explain it. 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