On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.
?
Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that
matter doesn't relay on geometry?
"comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear.
But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only
number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the
dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of
view, geometry, analysis, and physics. Then we can compare physics
with the empirical data and confirm of refute comp (but not proving
comp).
Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the
relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is
a whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not
the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata
would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.
That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not
to take for granted.
The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single
process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic
preference. A program is a functional shape whose relation with
other functional shapes is defined entirely by position. There is
no room for, nor plausible emergence of any kind of aesthetic
differences between functions we would assume are associated with
sight or sound, thought or feeling.
Why?
Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory
presentation beyond positions of bits.
So there is some sensory presentation.
In reality there would be low level sensory presentation, but
without a theory of physics or computation which supports that, we
should not allow it to be smuggled in.
So we agree.
With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to
conflate that intangible principle with sensory participation,
Which conflation? On the contrary, once a machine self-refers, many
usually conflated views get unconflated.
The conflation is between computation and sensation. A machine has
no sensation,
I can agree. We must distinguish a machine from the person who own
that machine, or is supported by the machine.
but the parts of a machine ultimately are associated with low level
sensations at the material level.
If that exist.
It is on those low level sensory-motor interactions which high level
logics can be executed, instrumentally, with no escalation of
awareness.
May be you should work with Stephen. Despite he defends comp, he point
constantly on math which should be better for a non-comp theory like
yours.
since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also.
Which ease, but does not solve the things, you need a self between.
Not sure how that relates, but how do you know that a self is needed?
Because sense makes sense for a subject, which is a person, and which
has different sort of self (like the 8 "hypostases" in comp + some
definition).
With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of
computation need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented
directly through 4-D material geometry.
Either it violates Church thesis, and then it is very interesting,
or not, and then it is a red herring for the mind-body peoblem, even
if quite interesting in practical applications.
My point is that computation need not have a mind -
A computation has no mind. But some computation can be assumed to
support a mind, or to mke it possible for a mind---a subject--- to
manifest itself with respect to different universal mind in the local
neighborhood.
it can be executed using bodies alone, and logic automata
demonstrates that is true.
"bodies alone" don't make sense in the comp theory.
In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which
is an anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic
direct participation.
In doing this, all what I see is that you eliminate the person who
got a brain prosthesis.
Saying that God made the human following his own image also expose a
difference, but not in a quite convincing way.
Why isn't the logic automata example convincing? Are you saying that
there still must be some mind there even though all functions are
executed by bodies? What is your objection?
It introduces a notion of bodies, when a simpler theory can explain
them, in a way making that simple theory testable.
Your argument that machine cannot support a mind mirrors the
elimination of person by materialists.
Logic automata proves that none of these differences are
meaningful in a functionalist universe.
?
That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same
configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a
visual experience or an auditory experience.
There is a big difference between computationalism and
functionalism. Comp says that functionalism is correct, at some
unknown level, and in fine, this plays some role, as we cannot know
which machine we are. We are only free to bet on some level, in case
we need some new body, or after death.
if functionalism was correct, you can replace the entire universe by
the program "do nothing", as it will do the same thing as the entire
universe.
A machine is *much* more than a function. In the math, we
distinguish intensional and extensional, to talk about that
difference. Modal logic aboard the intensional aspects, already
existing in the extensional math, when looked from some (internal or
not) point of view.
I think you conflate extension and intension (note the "s").
I would say that a machine is a collection of logical functions
which produce another collection of logical functions. What more is
there to it, or more to the point, what more is there which could
generate any aesthetic experience?
Truth.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
but would output behaviors consistent with our expectations for
those experiences.
Craig
Bruno
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