But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do
we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem


On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
>
>
> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.
>
> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about
> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal
> machine.
>
> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its
> theory of consciousness and matter.
>
> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in
> her head with the empirical facts.
> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well
> up to now.
>
>
>
>
> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?
>
>
> ?
> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis,
> guess, idea, etc.).
>
> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a
> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable
> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and
> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate
> a Turing universal machine.
>
>
>
>
>
> What comes to my mind is consciousness.
>
>
> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance
> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly
> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense,
> yet not prove or justify to other machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
>> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.
>>
>>
>> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in
>> a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution.
>>
>> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start
>> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non
>> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him
>> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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