On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to science before hand. I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious metaphysics
but not accepted as knowledge.

Why? Here we have a theory of how the mind work. Then we show that it has empirical and testable consequence.

In fact there is no theories more "scientific" than comp, I mean more testable. It says that the physical world is entirely in the head of the universal machine, in a precise and constructive sense, so we can compare that deducible physics with the observed one.

Bruno





On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:

But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem


We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true. In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can progress.

Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true.

Bruno





On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno,

Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?

This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.

In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal machine.

So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its theory of consciousness and matter.

To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in her head with the empirical facts. This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well up to now.




That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?

?
Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.).

Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine.





What comes to my mind is consciousness.

Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine.

Bruno




Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.

Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution.

I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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