Well, then make a testable prediction about something in the mind that is not otherwise known.
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to > science before hand. > I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious > metaphysics > but not accepted as knowledge. > > > Why? Here we have a theory of how the mind work. Then we show that it has > empirical and testable consequence. > > In fact there is no theories more "scientific" than comp, I mean more > testable. It says that the physical world is entirely in the head of the > universal machine, in a precise and constructive sense, so we can compare > that deducible physics with the observed one. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do >> we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem >> >> >> >> We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and >> verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the >> theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true. >> In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can >> progress. >> >> Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level >> such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of >> physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical >> reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its >> elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? >>> >>> >>> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. >>> >>> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about >>> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal >>> machine. >>> >>> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its >>> theory of consciousness and matter. >>> >>> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in >>> her head with the empirical facts. >>> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather >>> well up to now. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by >>> science? >>> >>> >>> ? >>> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, >>> guess, idea, etc.). >>> >>> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a >>> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable >>> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and >>> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate >>> a Turing universal machine. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What comes to my mind is consciousness. >>> >>> >>> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance >>> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly >>> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense, >>> yet not prove or justify to other machine. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural >>>> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. >>>> >>>> >>>> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and >>>> in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital >>>> substitution. >>>> >>>> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start >>>> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non >>>> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him >>>> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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