Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to science before hand. I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious metaphysics but not accepted as knowledge.
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do > we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem > > > > We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and > verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the > theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true. > In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can > progress. > > Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level > such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of > physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical > reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its > elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> Bruno, >> >> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.? >> >> >> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list. >> >> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about >> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal >> machine. >> >> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its >> theory of consciousness and matter. >> >> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in >> her head with the empirical facts. >> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well >> up to now. >> >> >> >> >> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science? >> >> >> ? >> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis, >> guess, idea, etc.). >> >> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a >> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable >> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and >> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate >> a Turing universal machine. >> >> >> >> >> >> What comes to my mind is consciousness. >> >> >> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance >> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly >> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense, >> yet not prove or justify to other machine. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural >>> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena. >>> >>> >>> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in >>> a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution. >>> >>> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start >>> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non >>> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him >>> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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