It would be nice if it somehow was programable (I think) since we could make 
things better, as well as destroy everything. But what is new about that? Do 
you thus, give this person any creedence then, or not really?

http://www.onbeing.org/program/uncovering-codes-reality/feature/symbols-power-adinkras-and-nature-reality/1460


Sincerely,

Mitch
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jun 15, 2013 2:48 pm
Subject: Re: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, 
empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist




On 15 Jun 2013, at 16:33, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:


I wonder if a more precise way of stating this is to say, that like Platonism, 
there must be an underlying programming to the cosmos. That would cover the 
Idealism central feature. 



Arithmetical realism entails the the experienceable cosmos *cannot* be 
programmed, as it emerges from a sort of competitions between all "digital 
approximations" of it. 


Bruno











-----Original Message-----
From: chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jun 15, 2013 3:40 am
Subject: RE: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, 
empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist



Hi Rog

As you have described them a materialist could not be a "combination of both" 
rationalism and empiricism,  because you have them as diametrically opposed. If 
"reason alone" is the source of knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be 
combined to be. Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give 
much of a hoot about how knowledge is aquired.

More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches of 
intuitionism. The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind 
connecting with a realm of ideas is neither an act of reason nor sensory 
experience. Moreover, If logic is to be "deductive" then, by definition, 
conclusions must never follow from unexplainable leaps of intuition. If they do 
they have not been logically deduced, have they? And infact that is Penrose's 
point : leaps of intuition can not be modelled computationally. logic, 
ofcourse, can be. since, allegedly, minds can grope for and master facts beyond 
the scope of deduction, they must be qualitatively different from computer 
programs which can only deduce things logically. 

You really seem to have things back to front in this post.

Regards 

--- Original Message ---

From: "Roger Clough" <rclo...@verizon.net>
Sent: 15 June 2013 1:47 AM
To: "- Roger Clough" <rclo...@verizon.net>
Subject: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, 
empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist



In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, empiricists and 
rationalists--is a Platonist  
 
Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge is derived from sense experience. 
  
Rationalism is the doctrine that reason alone is a  source of knowledge and is 
independent of experience.   
Materialism is a combination of both philosophies.

These may sound like completely diffierent doctrines, but my point here is that 
all of these pursuits ultimately rely on intuition. 
They  afre both subbranches of intjuitionism.
 
Why ? Concerning rationalism, even deductive logic requires intuition to arrive 
at a conclusilon.
Concering empiricism, it is fairly obvious to see that experience
alone cannot provide us any conclusion. If you dpoubt that,
consider Peirce's three categories, in which Secondness is
the category of intuion, leading us from an experience to a fact.
 
So Penrose's recent excursion into Platonism should be taken more seriously,
for ultimately his criticizers, the empiricists and the rationalists, are both 
Platonists.
 

Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/14/2013    
See my Leibniz site at   
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 




-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to