On 16 Jun 2013, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote:
This note is addressed to all materialists, especially Prof.
Dennett. Getting from "me" to "I"'
Self-reference could be a subject/predicate relation. But that
doesn't say enough because
there are two possible perspectives:
1) "He is a man." Here you are referencing yourself in the 3rd
person or objective persepective. Bruno Marchall calls this "3p" .
2) "I am a man." This is 1st person. Marshall calls this "1p." 1p is
the subjective form of self-reference.
Do you see the difference ? Materialism and computer language only
gives us the objective (descriptive) or 3p format
because it does not contain a subjective element.
You get it when you apply Theaetetus definition of knowledge to the
description of the machine's belief (that's 3p, but then theaetetus'
definition is Bp & p, and crazily enough, incompleteness makes it a
working definition for a non nameable (by the subject) notion of 1p.
This is not obvious, as incompleteness is by itself not obvious, but
it works, and refute your point.
Leibniz gets around this problem by including a subjective element,
that which perceives the world through the top monad. This subjectrive
element is universal and isa what Plato called the One or Oversoul.
OK, but machines get it too.
To include such a subjective element, you need to have a point in the
brain which is something like a king, that does all of the
governing. He is not a simple homunculus, he makes sense of what the
visual signals in the optical nerves provides us with.
Yes that "point" exists, for machine's too.
Am I making any sense to you materialists? Can you see the
the "I" perspectiove (what i say above) and the "me" of
conventional materialistic theory ?
They can, but as long as they want to keep weak materialism (the
belief in some primary matter), they are obliged to eliminate it to
But Leibniz still hold on some primary matter. It is better to
backtrack to those who understood the first that "primary matter" is
not supported by any evidences, as the dream argument already suggests.
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