On 25 Jul 2013, at 23:01, Joseph Knight wrote:
So is physics best understood as a computer program with access to a
random oracle? (Coming from 1-indeterminacy.)
That is possible but should remain to be proved. A priori, physics
emerges from all computations, and the mixing of computability and non
computability might be non equivalent with computable + a random
oracle. I suspect it not, both empirically and theoretically with
computationalism.
Bruno
PS I will have to put my computer in a box, as I am moving, so I will
be disconnected for awhile. Thanks for being patient for a possible
answer to your next possible comment.
On Mar 31, 2013 8:13 AM, "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 31 Mar 2013, at 01:15, Joseph Knight wrote:
Sorry for the vagueness of my question; I would not count pi as a
physical constant. I would count the empirically determined
circumference:diameter ratio for a circle in our observed curved
spacetime as a physical constant.
The reason I asked is because Bruno has repeatedly claimed that
COMP=>"noncomputability of physics" but I'm wondering what exactly
this would mean in practice.
In practice it would mean that some phenomena are not predictible or
computable. Russell and Brent are right, it comes from the FPI
(first person indeterminacy) which introduces "genuine randomness"
in the first person experience.
In fact that randomness might be so great as leading to the "white
rabbits", and with comp it is astonishing that the world around us
seems so much computable. But the redundancy of the UD, and the
constraints of correct self-reference add much structure, and if
comp is true, that should be enough. The non computable sequence
will still have computable distribution, like with QM, when, for
example, we send a sheaf of electron is the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) on
a up/down Stern-Gerlach analyser. From the first person perspective,
this leads to uncomputable sequence of events (even incompressible
strings of up and down), but statistically, with Avogadro-like
numbers of particles, the electronic sheaf will just split in
symmetrical halves, like the big number statistical laws predict.
It is an open problem if there are non computable constants in
nature, as it is an open problem if some oracle might play a role in
the development of the appearance of physical laws in the UD (or in
arithmetic). That seems unlikely, but who knows? As Brent says, that
would be hard to test, but it might make some sense from theoretical
assumption, both in comp-physics, and in theoretical physics. Note
that it is easy to build a non computable solution to the SWE
(something like Ae^ikHt, with k a non computable number, but it is
impossible to test the non computability of such wave in case they
occur. Machines can prove only the individual incompressibility of a
*finite* number of strings.
Bruno
On Mar 30, 2013 6:53 PM, "Russell Standish" <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 04:15:54PM -0700, Joseph Knight wrote:
> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical
constant is non
> computable?
>
I would say false, unless you can say that pi is _not_ a physical
constant. Another example that springs to mind is the magnetic moment
of the neutron which is definitely physical, but maybe not
fundamental.
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