On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <snip> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the >>>>> ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So >>>>> number >>>>> exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make >>>>> true >>>>> Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different notions of >>>>> epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of existence >>>>> as >>>>> we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as they >>>>> are >>>>> unavoidable. They will make true proposition with the shape [] Ex [] >>>>> P(x), >>>>> or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc... >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing >>>> to learn because it seems to require removing things from your thought >>>> process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because >>>> it's simple. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it simplifies, >>> indeed. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> So we will get notions of psychological >>>>> existence, physical existence, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ok, but what is the computational substrate? >>> >>> >>> >>> *any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal system >>> will do. >>> >>> I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K combinators >>> will >>> do as well, or the Unitary group, etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> There is still a >>>> dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back >>>> to the idea of God, in a way. >>> >>> >>> >>> God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and >>> multiply. >> >> >> Ok. I'm agnostic, so I don't cringe at this sort of statement. I guess >> I'm also an atheist, because I reject the idea of anthropomorphised >> gods, but that's irrelevant here. My dissatisfaction with this is >> empirical: god has been used so many times to cover up for our lack of >> knowledge that, when confronted with current lack of knowledge and one >> hears the word "god" one tends to become suspicious. On the other >> hand, if there is something fundamental we provably can't know, I >> guess it's fair enough to call that thing "god". But I think we should >> be extra-extra-careful before making that move. > > > > I am agnostic too. But, like for consciousness, we can agree on some > proposition about those notion, and reason from there. > > As you know I use "god" in a very large sense, and then, with comp and the > classical theory of knowledge, "god" or "divine" means mainly "true", or > related to true, with in mind the idea that "truth" is not something > definable, although we can agree on many truth. > > > > >> >>> All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering >>> Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably existing as >>> a >>> consequence of the addition and multiplication laws. >>> >>> If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you can >>> understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as seen >>> from >>> different internal self-referential view, contains such "universal >>> matrix", >>> or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1 complete set of number, or a >>> Post creative set, a universal purpose computer, reflecting itself. >>> >>> Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity of a >>> block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even yet >>> made >>> enough precise. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It's just what is. But then this is an >>>> ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use the >>>> previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you? >>> >>> >>> >>> I can't. I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even for >>> "good" >>> (relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable history) >>> reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental reality. >>> The >>> physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made by a universal >>> machine/number, and selected or varied through first person (sometimes >>> plural) experiences. >>> >>> There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on >>> computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids, as >>> the >>> empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from the >>> machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to the >>> intensional >>> variants, the arithmetical hypostases). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> Even events seen in dreams get some >>>>> notion of existence, for example. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That's nice. I even have problems with statements like "batman doesn't >>>> exist". >>> >>> >>> >>> Really? >>> >>> I will send you a video! >>> >>> >>> >>>> Doesn't he, in some sense? >>> >>> >>> >>> Certainly, in many sense. He has "real" cousins, like jetman: >>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=x2sT9KoII_M >> >> >> A batman with a french accent! Coincidence? > > > Europa is full of thinks. Dracula has also many cousins ... > > Are there any coincidence? Well, they are all relative too. > > > > >> >>> >>> And certainly not, in some common sense. >>> >>> Here, with comp, it is easy at the start, only 0, s(0), s(s(0), ... >>> exist. >>> >>> The rest will come from the many relationships the number inherits from >>> the >>> + and * laws. (+ the comp invariance of consciousness manifestation and >>> experience for the digital substitution at some level). That gives the >>> relative perceptions, the dreams, the beliefs, and (but only God knows), >>> the >>> truth. >>> >>> If we don't recover common sense existence, we fail. But unless comp is >>> false, why should it contradicts common sense? Thanks to Everett we do >>> have >>> evidence of sharable histories and stable first person scenarios. Comp >>> get >>> close to solipsism, but should avoid it. >> >> >> But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where >> there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No? > > > I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are intensional > nuances. > > The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two arms, (Bp), > then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two arms, and it > is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the observer I, > when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible, not > contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or equivalently that > 0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,
> equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the > "feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p". Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a feeler? > They all see arithmetic very differently. > The modalities Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p, are solipsistic, by their non > communicable/justifiable relation with truth. But the others are not. > > > > >> >>> Comp will doubtfully change most of >>> physics, no more than evolution can changed actual biology. >> >> >> Right. Or even evolution itself can be seen in a new light under the >> MWI, but there's no reason to reject it. It might just not be the >> ultimate approximation to truth (like classical vs. modern physics). > > > OK. > > Bruno > > > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> We cannot invite him for coffee but >>>> we can talk about him and we all know what we're talking about. >>> >>> >>> >>> No doubt. >>> >>> I think that with comp you don't have to believe in anything more than >>> the >>> independence of the numbers' properties and relationships. >>> >>> Plato's God is truth, and with comp, if sigma_1 truth is enough for the >>> ontology, you need much more than the arithmetical truth, to get the >>> inside >>> view(s) and their mathematics. >>> >>> Fortunately, this is reflected only on the first order extensions of the >>> arithmetic hypostases. That has been worked out for G and G* by the >>> Russian >>> and Georgian logicians. See Boolos 1993 for this. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
