On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 9:43 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as opposed
>>>> to Dp?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you can
>>> interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.
>>>
>>> As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called normal
>>> modal
>>> logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt. "Dt"
>>> will
>>> just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be true
>>> in
>>> that world.
>>
>>
>> Ok, thanks.
>> If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
>> [] for the necessity operator)
>
>
> [] p means that p is true in all accessible worlds. But this makes []p true,
> for all p, in the cul-de-sac worlds. We reason in classical logic. "If alpha
> is accessible then p is true in alpha" is trivially true, because for any
> alpha "alpha is accessible" is false, for a cul-de-sac world.
>
> And incompleteness makes such cul-de-sac worlds unavoidable (from each
> world), in that semantics. In fact [] t is provable in all worlds, but Dt is
> provable in none, meaning, in that semantics, that a cul-de-sac world is
> always accessible.
>
> If you interpret "accessing a culd-de-sac world" as dying, the machine told
> us that she can die at each instant! (of course there are other
> interpretations).

Nice!

>
>
>
>> Is there any conceivable world where D~t?
>
>
> No.
> But the Z logic can have DDf, like the original (non normal) first modal
> logic of Lewis (the S1, S2, S3, less known than S4 (knowlegde) and S5
> (basically Leibniz many-worlds, used by Gödel in his formal "proof of the
> existence of God")
>
>
>
>> If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?
>
>
> Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!
>
>
>
>
>> Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?
>
>
> ~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream, lie, and
> "near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.

Thus your interest in near-death experiences?

> We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our
> universality.
>
> The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of
> freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to write
> it:
>
> <>t -> ~[]<>t
> <>t -> <> [] f
> []<>t -> [] f

I don't understand how you arrive at this equivalence.

> In G (and thus in arithmetic, with [] = beweisbar, and f = "0 = 1", and t =
> "1= 1".

Thanks!
Telmo.

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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