On 25 Sep 2013, at 05:44, LizR wrote:
On 25 September 2013 15:41, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 9/24/2013 6:32 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 September 2013 13:38, Russell Standish
<[email protected]> wrote:
This is also true of materialism. Whether you think this is a problem
or not depends on whether you think the "hard problem" is a problem
or not.
Indeed. I was about to say something similar (to the effect that
it's hard to imagine how "mere atoms" can have sights, sounds,
smells etc either).
As a rule, if you want to explain X you need to start from something
without X.
Absolutely.
If you know of such an explanation, or even the outlines of one, I'd
be interested to hear it. As Russell said, this is the so-called
"hard problem" so any light (or sound, touch etc) on it would be
welcome.
Computationalism explains it by showing that machines observing
themselves are confronted with many truth that she has to find non
justifiable from her own perspective. This leads to a rich variety of
candidates for qualia (mainly given by the []* logics: S4Grz1, Z1*,
X1*). The price is that "matter persistent appearances" must be
explained from the (first person plural) communicable parts of those
logics. And it works as we get a free arithmetical quantization which
already gives a "quantum logic". That makes also the comp + classical-
theory-of-knowledge testable (and partially tested).
Bruno
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