On 9/25/2013 10:27 PM, chris peck wrote:
Interesting. There's another thought experiment, or gambit, MWIers raise involving
In this, some quantum event at time t triggers a gun to shoot (or not shoot)
Traditionally, MWIers argue the only reason they would not take the gambit is because
they would leave behind grieving family in one MWI branch. They are not in any doubt
over whether they would survive in the other branch. Thus, in this case the
probabilities are governed by a conjunction. They are both convinced they will be killed
and convinced they will survive. There is no 1-p indeterminacy about either prior to the
Now the logic of q-immortality and your MWI analog of Bruno's thought experiment seem to
me to be the same. But, the MWIers apparently treat the two inconsistently. How can one
be uncertain about whether one will be in Moscow in one experiment but certain about
surviving in the other? Do you see my problem?
It's a question of what you care about. If you care about the future measure of 'you'
then quantum suicide is a bad idea; and generally you act as if you do care about this
measure in classical probability.
Another reason might come from reading Robert Charlies Wilson's "Divided by
"I do not fear death, in view of the fact that I had been dead for billions and billions
of years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience from it."'
--- Mark Twain
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