On 26 Sep 2013, at 07:27, chris peck wrote:
Hi Liz
Interesting. There's another thought experiment, or gambit, MWIers
raise involving quantum immortality.
In this, some quantum event at time t triggers a gun to shoot (or
not shoot) the MWIer.
Traditionally, MWIers argue the only reason they would not take the
gambit is because they would leave behind grieving family in one MWI
branch. They are not in any doubt over whether they would survive in
the other branch. Thus, in this case the probabilities are governed
by a conjunction. They are both convinced they will be killed and
convinced they will survive. There is no 1-p indeterminacy about
either prior to the quantum event.
There is no 3-p indeterminacy (he will both be killed), nor 1-p
indeterminacy (I will survive).
Now the logic of q-immortality and your MWI analog of Bruno's
thought experiment seem to me to be the same. But, the MWIers
apparently treat the two inconsistently. How can one be uncertain
about whether one will be in Moscow in one experiment but certain
about surviving in the other? Do you see my problem?
I do not see any problem. The 1-p indeterminacy bears only on the
computations where we survive. That is why we have to prune out the
continuation where we die formally this will be given by the
intensional nuance of provability/believability).
It *is* counter-intuitive, but, as you saw, no more than in Everett QM.
Bruno
> Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 22:00:55 -0700
> From: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
>
> On 9/25/2013 8:37 PM, LizR wrote:
> > Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought
experiment should logically
> > have the same problem with the MWI. If for the sake of argument
I use a quantum event to
> > decide whether to get on a plane to Moscow or Washington, then
my diary will contain one
> > or the other destination - in two universes - and the concept of
"I" has to take into
> > account that this is the case.
>
> Unless you take Scott Aaronson's view that teleportation requires
transmitting the quantum
> state to Moscow, in which case the no-cloning theorem implies that
the original in
> Helsinki is destroyed.
>
> I think that the relevant structure of the brain is quasi-
classical and so a classical
> copying will produce a working copy with a gap in memory, just
like anesthesia. But that
> also implies that the two copies will immediately be distinct.
They don't have to wait to
> look outside.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
