On 9/25/2013 8:37 PM, LizR wrote:
Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought experiment should logically
have the same problem with the MWI. If for the sake of argument I use a quantum event to
decide whether to get on a plane to Moscow or Washington, then my diary will contain one
or the other destination - in two universes - and the concept of "I" has to take into
account that this is the case.
Unless you take Scott Aaronson's view that teleportation requires transmitting the quantum
state to Moscow, in which case the no-cloning theorem implies that the original in
Helsinki is destroyed.
I think that the relevant structure of the brain is quasi-classical and so a classical
copying will produce a working copy with a gap in memory, just like anesthesia. But that
also implies that the two copies will immediately be distinct. They don't have to wait to
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