On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

        I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

        http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136


    From the paper:

    "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is 
a
    good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so 
far. So
    she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. 
There
    is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
    What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
    invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
    expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to 
see
    spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
    she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

    But this is where the basis problem comes in.


The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time.

That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the brain have access to this and not that? Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being "this world". But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.


      Why is the experience classical?  Why doesn't Alice simply experience the
    superposition?


There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others.

    Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently 
inexperiential?


Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents in other times.

But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM is time symmetric. The question is why does "experience" adhere only with these certain states which we call 'classical'.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to