On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:27 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of >>> >>> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 >>> >> >> From the paper: >> >> "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 >> is a >> good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so >> far. So >> she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. >> There >> is nothing left for her to be uncertain about. >> What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I >> invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 >> should >> expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect >> to see >> spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not >> that >> she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)" >> >> >> But this is where the basis problem comes in. >> > > The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under > special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we > find ourselves in this particular "now"? > > I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to > within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain > doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only > limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular > conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time. > > > That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the > brain have access to this and not that? > I am not really following what question you are asking. Are you asking why the brain state is isolated, or why we (who are here) are not experiencing the them (over there)? > Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they > are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being "this > world". > The brain is a classical computer operating on classical information. It does not operate upon or process qubits so I don't see any reason it should be conscious of its multiplicity. The information patters in differently conscious brains are not accessible. > But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical > - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. > > Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand? I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things. > > > > >> Why is the experience classical? Why doesn't Alice simply experience >> the superposition? >> > > There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different > experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have > decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information > exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the > experiences of the others. > > >> Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently >> inexperiential? >> > > Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago > "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents > in other times. > > > But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a > state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM > is time symmetric. The question is why does "experience" adhere only with > these certain states which we call 'classical'. > I think Ron Garrett gives a good explanation for this. In short, measurement and entanglement are the same phenomenon. See this part where he describes quantum information theory: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc&t=46m25s Jason > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
