On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:59, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:
On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you. Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical.

Okay.

But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical. So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable process. Turing machines are classical.


Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases. So how does it feel?


Let me make sure I understand the question. Let us say we are in a metal box (like Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a super position of having measured both states. You are asking what it feels like to the person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside the box?

If so, I think the answer is rather clear. It doesn't matter what the person outside the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition, and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be performing the measurement and has split. Had they known the entire state of the wave function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.

That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just being dispersed into the enivronment.

Why? On the contrary; the superposition is not destroyed. The first observer memeory is just entangled with the state of the particle.

If they were in a superposition then so would their memory of what they had written be in a superposition. Implicit in the description is that the superposition has turned into a mixture and the cross- terms (interference) is no longer present IN the particular basis that measured the spin.

But they are still present. They just get close to zero, describing quasi-classical worlds. We just trace thel out, because the superposition has leaked in the environment.






If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis. But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question. Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

But the natural evolution, and the building of a brain does select a base, if you accept that our memory state is classical, which is the case in comp.

I don't see that it is the case in comp. That seems to me an additional axiom which has to be added to solve the basis problem by fiat. I don't see that comp can entail QM and then just assume that experience will be classical.

?
Just look at any definition of any universal machine.




The fact that we don't "feel superposition" is only an empirical confirmation that we have a classical brain,

I understand that. But it is not predicted by comp and so cannot be taken as evidence supporting comp.

The point is that it must be predicted by comp. If we get something different, then comp is refuted. Possible, but not yet done. We have to extract QM first, and then the usual decoherence theory will be retrieved automatically.

Platonism implies the arithmetical truth is boolean. Intuitionism and quantum logics emerges from internal epistemological machine's points of view (through the intensional nuances on self-reference).

Bruno




Brent

approximated by a quantum, but macroscopic, brain. The human original universal machine, our ancestor the amoeba, has chosen the base. It is a geographical-historical happening.

Bruno




Brent

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