On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
*On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:
On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com
The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under
relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we
ourselves in this particular "now"?
I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to
we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the
But *I *don't find myself in all the nows. Why not?
I've highlighted the answer for you. Why should anyone (including you)
word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do
find themselves in other times?
Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.
How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a
superposition should feel like?
First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a
brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical.
But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical. So
appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.
He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable
process. Turing machines are classical.
Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases. So how
does it feel?
Let me make sure I understand the question. Let us say we are in a metal box (like
Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of
this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a
super position of having measured both states. You are asking what it feels like to the
person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside
If so, I think the answer is rather clear. It doesn't matter what the person outside
the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition,
and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the
perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be
performing the measurement and has split. Had they known the entire state of the wave
function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one
observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer
has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he
does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers
have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.
That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just
being dispersed into the enivronment. If you take MWI seriously the whole system
(including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either
"spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly
separates the superpositions in that basis. But to say that is the preferred basis is to
beg the question. Not begging the question is "the basis problem".
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