Bruno wrote *Not when doing science. (pseudo-science and pseudo-religion only).* * * Science as applied to the so far learned fraction of the infinite complexity? If there ever was a 'pseudo-science' - that is one (I mean the conventional pretension used for those "ALMOST" perfect technicalities Brent was mentioning to me.) Our 'model' (science?) is constantly growing. So: NEWER arguments are emerging and older ones are rejected. I appreciate your parallel between science and religion. Our world is a fractional model so far cleared to the capabilities of the human mentality. Are you thinking of SCIENCE (all caps) of the infinite Universal M., not reachable presently for us weak-minded humans?
*You still need some notion of possible truth, without which 'agnosticism" lost his meaning. This can lead to instrumentalism.* *** *You will need a theory with more forms of absolute to develop the idea that 17 is prime is a human logic relative idea.* * * Agnosticism - for me - is not a philosophical theorem: it is just marking our ignorance about 'all of it' except for the few we already "GOT" and adjusted to the meek capabilities of the developing human mind. I am also at a loss how I would driven towards 'instrumentalism'. In my (virgin?) agnosticism I even leave open what kind of content could be - and HOW - intertwined in the (unknowable) infinite complexity, which has SOME influence upon - how we visualize at all our 'model-world content'. Absolutes are scientific/religious belief items we try to hold on to. Possible truth is our figment. About "17"? I am no mathematician, so a fantasy of math-systems is free to me. I figure a dynamic number-world flipping between series of its own integers, like the base of 'your' arithmetic and another one like expressable as 1.7, 3.4, 5.1... in which 17 is a "tenfold" of the first one, not a prime. This would be with all the 'primes' in our primitive number-world. Flip-flop. (Just musing!) Not so incredible for an Infinite Universal Machine. (I have imagination). As for now I am not (yet?) asking for a patent on this system. Have a good Halloween John Mikes On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 20 Oct 2013, at 21:03, John Mikes wrote: > > Brent: I like to write insted of "we know" - "we THINK we know" and it > goes further: Bruno's "provable' - in many cases - applies evidences (to > 'prove') from conventional science (reductionist figments) we still THINK > we know. > > > Not when doing science. (pseudo-science and pseudo-religion only). > > > > I don't think I use the term "T R U E" at all - in my agnosticism. > > > You still need some notion of possible truth, without which 'agnosticism" > lost his meaning. This can lead to instrumentalism. > > > You had a remark lately to remind me that our 'imperfect' worldview > resulted in many many practical achievements so far. I did not respond the > missing adjective "almost" - meaning the many failures and mishaps such > achievements are involved with. We approach the practical usability. > > Another chapter includes math - the *result* of certain HUMAN logic - in > which 17 is defined as a 'prime'. A different logic may devise a different > math with different number-concept in which the equivalent of 17 is NOT a > prime. > > > You will need a theory with more forms of absolute to develop the idea > that 17 is prime is a human logic relative idea. > > > > Bruno > > > I find it a mathematically impressed concept that the 'world' is > describable by numbers (arithmetic series) and not vice versa. Nobody > showed me so far a natural occurrence where arithmetic connotations were > detectable by non-arithmetic trains of thought. > > JohnM > > > On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 6:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 10/19/2013 3:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 08:17:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 08 Oct 2013, at 11:51, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> >>>> I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as >>>>>>> "I know >>>>>>> p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is >>>>>>> entirely in >>>>>>> the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT. >>>>>>> >>>>>> Correct. Only the perspective change. "Bp" is "Toto proves p", said >>>>>> by Toto. >>>>>> "Bp & p" is "Toto proves p" and p is true, as said by Toto (or not), >>>>>> and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but >>>>>> not arithmetical predicate). >>>>>> >>>>> It's the same Toto in both cases... What's the point? >>>>> >>>> The difference is crucial. Bp obeys to the logic G, which does not >>>> define a knower as we don't have Bp -> p. >>>> At best, it defines a rational believer, or science. Not knowledge. >>>> But differentiating W from M, is knowledge, even non communicable >>>> knowledge. You can't explain to another, that you are the one in >>>> Washington, as for the other, you are also in Moscow. Knowledge >>>> logic invite us to define the first person by the knower. He is the >>>> only one who can know that his pain is not fake, for example. >>>> >>>> You've hinted at fixed points being relevant here for the concept of >>> I. >>> >>> So to have an 'I', you need the statement []p->p to be a theorem? >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>> and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of >>>>>>> the pronoun is also not relevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of >>>>>> the 1-view. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let us define [o]p by Bp & p >>>>>> >>>>>> I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p). >>>>>> >>>>>> ??? >>>>> >>>> >>>> B([o]p) is the statement made by the ideal rationalist believer (B) >>>> on a first person point of view ([o]). Here [o]p can be seen as an >>>> abbreviation for Bp & p. >>>> >>> In English, the first statement is that I believe I know something, >>> and the second is that I know I know somthing. >>> >>> >>>> [o]([o]p is the first person statement ([o]) on a first person point >>>> of view ([o]). >>>> >>>> So, according to you, knowledge is a first person point of view. What >>> I still get stuck on is that we may know many things, but the only >>> things we can know we know are essentially private things things, such >>> as the fact that we are conscious, or what the colour red seems like >>> to us. >>> >> >> Bruno seems to equate "know" with "provable and true". So we know that >> 17 is prime. In fact we *know* infinitely many theorems that are provable, >> but which no one will ever prove - which seems like a strange meaning of >> "know". >> >> Brent >> >> >> >>> Are these all things you would say satisfy the proposition [o]([o]p) >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> Visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> . >> For more options, visit >> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> . >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
