On 30 October 2013 19:03, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > My point was only that the traditional notions of personal identity: > saying this person is that one particular continuation of that biological > organism, or of that one brain, do not work. They fail in cases of fusion, > fission, duplication, radical change, amnesia, etc. and must be rejected in > favor of more consistent definitions of personal identity. > > That is exactly what comp does, and that is at least part of the point of the teleportation thought experiments. One of the results of comp is that personal identity is split into steps, normally called observer moments (the length of these moments isn't known), and that personal survival from moment to moment is exactly the same as survival during a duplication experiment. In comp, at least, a person is a series of discrete states, a "Capsule theory" of memory and identity rather like the pigeonholes in Fred Hoyle's "October the First is too late".
I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I have got anything wrong there. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
