Hi Jason

You're presenting the exact same situation in a different context in the hope 
that it will clarify the issues for me, I suppose. My response is exactly the 
same for your new version as it is for the original. The same as it is for 
Bruno's example in which the duplications involved explode to cover every 
possible permutation of pixel combinations that could occur over a 90 minute 
period on a telly. 

Perhaps a better tack might be to accept that I understand the issues under 
debate, and address the arguments that I offer directly rather than claim 
'misunderstanding' etc. 

How can uncertainty arise in a subject who believes he knows all the relevent 
facts?

How does a prediction of 50/50 not contravene the axiom that I survive 
anihilation and duplication into two (any number of) branches?

regards.


Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:12:55 +1300
Subject: Re: Step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it 
easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an 
AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI 
could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI 
style splitting.


What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and 
remain red. There are copies of it which see the ball go blue at various 
points...

However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know what 
"it" will see, or to be more exact it knows that "it" will see all 
combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an "it" but a "them". 
Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones 
aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with 
varied experiences.


In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, 
because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into 
different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being 
copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that 
its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours.


So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything?



On 30 October 2013 09:41, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:




On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:



  
    
  
  
    On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch
      wrote:

    
    
      Chris,
        

        
        Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person
          indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with
          programming, but I will try to elaborate those details):
        

        
        Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual
          environment (an open field)
        Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is
          looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads:
        
          "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the
            protocol will begin.  In the protocol, the process
            containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after
            the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the
            parent process and it will change to blue in the child
            process (forking duplicates a process into two identical
            copies, with one called the parent and the other the child).
            A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork
            will happen.  This will happen 8 times leading to 256
            processes, after which the simulation will end."
        
        It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to
          see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds?

        
      
    
    

    I don't see that as any different.  
It is similar, but it never hurts to look at the same problem from different 
angles.  What is a little more evident in this case is that of the 256 possible 
memories of the AI about to meet its doom, none contain the memory of seeing 
all 256 possibilities, an in fact, the majority of them see the ball change 
color back and forth at random.  Only 2 see it stay all red or all blue for the 
last 8 seconds. None of them can predict from the view inside the simulation, 
whether the ball will stay the same color or change after the next fork occurs.

 The problem is still what is the
    referent of "the AI".  As John Clark points out "the AI" is
    ambiguous when there are duplicates.
Personal identity is less of an issue in this case, because it concerns the AI 
or anything/anyone else inside the simulation who might also be viewing the 
ball.  In this way, it is slightly more analogous to MWI since it is the 
environment which is duplicated, not just the person, and so the apparent 
random changing of the ball color is also something that can be agreed upon by 
the group of observers within the simulation.

   Sometimes Bruno talks about
    "the universal person" who is merely embodied as particular
    persons.  So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal
    person sees Washington and Moscom. 
But not "at the same time" or as "an integrated experience", so the appearance 
of randomness still arises from the first person perspective(s).

  But then that's contrary to
    identifying a person by their memories.  My view is that "a person"
    is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's
    true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter.


What model should be used in a world with duplication, fission machines, mind 
uploading, split brains, biological clones, amnesia, etc.? Or does personhood 
no longer make sense at all in the face of such situations?


Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological 
or physiological continuity can be successful. Jason





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