Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details):
Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end." It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds? Jason On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 29 Oct 2013, at 02:13, chris peck wrote: > > Hi Jason > > *>> Right but when you refer to "the experience" or "chris peck's > experiences", that is speaking in the third person.* > > It should make no difference to your argument at all. > > > That makes the difference, because the prediction concerned the future > first person experience. > > > In fact Bruno's step 3 is written in the third person too. > > > All science is 3p. Even when the subject-matter is the 1p. Comp makes that > possible. > > > You're confusing how the set up is described with what is actually thought > by the protagonists. In fact let me use a paragraph from Bruno's step 3 > replacing the issues under debate, that way there can be no confusion about > the fact that I not mistaking a 1-p view for a 3-p view any more than he is. > * > Bruno's version (and take special note of the use of third person > descriptions):* > > *Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the > experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess > he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He > is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty. This is remarkable because > from a third person point of view the experiment is completely > deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the > time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being > indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of > indeterminacy, bearing on the possible consistent extensions, when they > are observed by the first person, as both diaries can witness. This is what > I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. Giving > that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes > for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the > event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” Before proceeding the > experiencer is in a state of maximal ignorance.* > * > Corrected version:* > > *[Given] * > > > OK. > > > *the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment > about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he [can] > predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is > confronted to an unavoidable [certainty]. This is [unremarkable] * > > > Of course remarkable/unremarkable is a bit subjective. But what is > remarkable is that a pure third person deterministic reality explained a > strong form of indeterminacy, by logic and arithmetic alone, without > invoking QM. Everett does that too, but needs to postulate QM. Here we > postulate mechanism only. > > > > > *because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely > deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the > time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being > indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of [determinacy], > * > > > No. Of indeterminacy. Unless you can provide an algorithm of prediction. > > > > *bearing on the [certain] consistent extensions, when they are observed > by the first person, [regardless of what] both diaries can witness. This is > what I [shouldn't] call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just > 1-indeterminacy. [Regardless] that Moscow and Washington are permutable > without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to > ascribe a probability of 100% to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. > Washington).” [because] Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of > maximal [knowledge].* > > > The prediction "I will be in Moscow" cannot be 100%, as the guy > reconstituted in Washington will understand. > Both the guy in M and in W knows that 100% has to be excluded. > > > > > * > >> According to your usage, how is the meaning of "subjective certainty" > different from just "certainty"?* > > They are identical. Bruno argues that if everyone is certain or uncertain > of something then this certainty become 'objective' in some sense. > > > I never did that. You misunderstood the point. I just explained that some > "uncertainty about 1p" can be communicated in a 3p way. It is the fact that > they are necessarily uncertain which makes them objective. > Comp and Everett provides examples. > > > > > Its an irrelevant point he makes but nevertheless it is wrong. Its a > confusion between solipsism and subjectivism. certainty and uncertainty are > predicates applicable only to subjects. 'I's. And no matter how many people > hold a belief or are certain or uncertain of something those certainties / > uncertainties are only ever subjective. > > > The uncertainty in lottery are objective, computable, and people makes > money on them. Boltzmann statistics are objective, obeys laws. You are > confusing the fact that we do have a subjective uncertainty related to > them, but the roots of the uncertainty can be mathematical, logical, > physical, etc. > > > > > *>> After the duplication there are two experiencers. <--[notice the > third person description you're employing here!] Each is confronted with > the impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they > would next have following the duplication. The knowledge that all > experiences will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty.* > > I keep pointing out that the question is asked prior to duplication and > you keep ignoring that. > > > That makes the point. prior to duplication, the subject is totally > ignorant of what he will feel after. > > > > * > >> According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you > know future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually > experience all possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal > feelings of the original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and > experiencing himself becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not > subjective in the sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should > literally imagine what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber > and be duplicated.* > > > Imagining what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber from a > first person perspective is precisely what I am doing. And you can not > ignore the fact that the experiencer will have a certain set of beliefs as > he goes in. Infact, it is axiomatic to Bruno's reasoning that we assume the > experiencer is a 'comp practitioner' who would 'say yes' to the doctor. ie. > it is axiomatic that the experiencer has a very specific set of beliefs. If > you don't take these beliefs into account then *you* are not imagining what > it would be like to be the experiencer. > > > Jason said that. > > > > So, when the question is asked, you are not about to see (Washington or > Moscow), you are about to see (Washington and Moscow), because there is > only one of you at this point, and critically -- and heres the bit which > makes it genuinely 1-p -- you are certain of all this. Your subjective > view, your 'what is it like to be', your phenomenological state, your > whateveryouwantocallit, is saturated with the conviction that you are going > to end up in both washington and moscow. > > > From the 3p view, but the question is about the 1p unique experience that > you will live. You know with ceratinty, prior to the duplication, that you > will feel to be in only one city. > > > > There will be no room for doubt until you open your eyes at the terminal. > At which point the game has changed radically. Now you know that you have > been annihilated and duplicated but do not know which duplicate you are. > Here you would predict 50/50 but not before. Certainly not when the > question is asked in step 3. > > > If I can predict today that tomorrow I will be in a state of uncertainty, > then I am already in a state of undertainty. Opening the door is part of > the experience: you push on a button and open the door. > > You remark here is irrelevant, and should not change anything in the > reasoning. So, you *do* accept 50%. So you can proceed to step 4. > > > > > > > *>> Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can > even say in truth there is only one "I", but this does not remove the > appearance of randomness as seen from the first person views* > > Its my contention that there would be no appearance of randomness. > > > It appears, for simple mathematical reason, in all the diaries. > > > > > > Our perceptions are coloured by our beliefs. If we are genuine MWIers for > example, we would not experience a feeling of randomness at all. We would > percieve things as wholly determined. > > > Not at all. MWIers explains that SWE *must* entail randomness, and exactly > the randomness we observed. It explains why we cannot see the whole > deterministic wave. > > At least you criticize both the 1p randomness in comp and in MWI. That's > better than Clark. > > > > > > *>> I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem? I > wonder what answer you would agree with:* > > I have. I studied Philosophy at UCL and watched Malcolm Budd and Ted > Honderich tear Arnold Zuboff to shreds on a regular basis at departmental > seminars. The thing is sleeping beauty is in a state of maximal ignorance > so I don't see how it relates. > > *>> Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether > the machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both > locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), > distinguish these two cases?* > > Again, where there is ignorance there can be doubt. But it isn't the doubt > you want which is doubt in state of maximal knowledge. > > *>> Okay, that is fair.* > > I'm beginning to think Bruno defines 'self' in terms of self reference > within certain modal logics. > > > Not at all. With only s, 0, + and *. The trick is the Dx = "xx" method > that I have often described with some detail, but UDA does not need it. The > 3p and 1p diaries are quite enough for the UDA. > > > > provability logic etc. > > > The provability logic are derived from s, 0, + and *. > > > > > Its a circular definition which I imagine will be problematic. > > > Which shows you lack some elementary computer science. The (3p) self study > is where computer science excels the most. There are many good books. > > > > but again my modal logic is very rusty so I won't argue the point ... > > > Modal logic plays no fundamental role at all. It just happens that some > modal logics capture soundly and completely machine's self-referential > proposition. > > I think you understood enough to handle step 4. So please proceed. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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