On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 10:25 PM, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>wrote:

> Hi Jason (again)
>
> in your response to Brent:
>
> *
> >>Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one
> psychological or physiological continuity can be successful.*
>
> ok, but in Bruno's step 3 it is taken as axiomatic that you survive in
> both branches because there is a continuity of psychological phenomena like
> memory.
>

When I said "one" psychological or physiological continuity, I mean exactly
that.  It is impossible to attach (define an identity) as any one
(1/single) continuation. If you try to define a person as some
physiological, material, or biological continuation, you can throw a wrench
in that with any kind of duplication / slow matter replacement experiment.
If you try to define someone as being one particular psychological
continuation, you fork them or duplicate them, or slowly alter their
psychology so they have a different personality, memories, etc., and you
can end up with quite a different psychology than you started with.  Is it
still the same person?  To remain consistent, either the definition of
person must collapse to that of a single observer moment (a single lone
thought or experience), or it must be expanded quite broadly. But if you
expand it broadly, that leads to an ever-spreading spectrum which
encompasses all experiences and all beings.  There is then only a single
person.  This is all that I meant, that one cannot consistently say that a
person is only this or that individual and no one else.



> this is the 'yes doctor' axiom. Being an axiom Bruno doesn't need to
> defend it. We are obliged to assume it.
>

Yes, for the purpose of the reasoning that follows.


>
> That said, taking issue with it is tantamount to admitting that we do not
> survive the teleportation, in which case the probability of me seeing
> Moscow or Washington is 0.
>

That is my understanding.


>
> There is a concept of the observer moment. A discrete snippet of
> experience and the UD is churning these out willy nilly in a digital form.
> Or maybe they're all just there in an infinite plenitude of blah. Now the
> observer moments can be in any old order. A moment from tomorrow can be
> churned out before a moment from yesterday. Identity emerges as a trace of
> coherent memory. There is no need for an inherent order between the
> elements so long as there is some means of coherently connecting the
> observer moments. In this scheme the order is implicit in the notion of
> coherent memory.
>

That may be one way to view it, but I am not sure if that is how Bruno sees
it.  He sees the "flow" of consciousness as governed/ordered by the future
directions of the (infinite) computational processes that support one's
current (to use your term) observer moment.  If you could identify your
current experience right now with any one of an infinite number of
programs, then your future experiences would consist of a future
continuation of any one of (from your perspective, chosen at random) those
infinite programs supporting your current state.


> To use an analogy from IT , I suspect its the difference between sorting
> an array of shuffled digital cards or just keeping track of pointers to
> cards in an array when shuffling. Like wise physics emerges in this
> coherent trace. For example, in one observer moment a pen is dropped. Whats
> next? An observer moment where the pen goes down? One where it goes up? One
> where it goes right or left? All these moments are catered for in the
> infinite plenitude. So physics, here the law of gravity, becomes an
> investigation into a psychologically consistent trace of pen moments. All
> those where the pen keeps going down in my trace. Its going to be tricky to
> keep track of traces because they criss-cross. That is, all moments in some
> sense are coherent with one another.
>

This is where Bruno speaks of the importance of "long histories".  To get
to your current state, probable explanations include evolution of life,
etc., which required stable laws, and many other assumptions about how the
world looks.  If the majority of those programs are shorter than the longer
programs which are more complex and contain exceptions to these rules which
have worked for billions of years, then with a high probability, the laws
that have held true and led to your current experience will continue to
remain true.  Though of course, this is not guaranteed, and such cases are
known as "white rabbit" universes, after Alice in Wonderland.


> The pen down one vertical voxel is a consistent with moments where the pen
> is at any of the voxel neighbors, up down, left right, back forward. Taking
> different velocities into account it doesn't even have to be a neighboring
> voxel. Where is velocity anyway? Is it between the moments? Within the
> moments. A problem here I think.
>

It may look something like this: http://www.weidai.com/qm-interpretation.txt

Mathematics and mathematical truth, are after all, unchanging.  Yet there
is an defined ordering to computational states of recursive functions.
Consider the evolution of a recursive function that executed the Game of
Life, and within this game of life are complex self-aware patterns, that
observe the entire state of their world change from each state to the
next.  There would be a time-like ordering to each of these states, and
change would appear to occur from within the inside of entities existing as
a pattern within this recursive function.


>
> Anyway, the point is that continuity between moments seems to me to be a
> big, big deal in this scenario. So, if you are of the view that continuity
> isn't even sufficient to maintain identity then I wonder to what degree you
> really are on the same page as Bruno.
>

My point was only that the traditional notions of personal identity: saying
this person is that one particular continuation of that biological
organism, or of that one brain, do not work.  They fail in cases of fusion,
fission, duplication, radical change, amnesia, etc. and must be rejected in
favor of more consistent definitions of personal identity.

Jason


>
> best regards.
>
> ------------------------------
> From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: RE: Step 3
> Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 02:18:43 +0000
>
>
> Hi Jason
>
> You're presenting the exact same situation in a different context in the
> hope that it will clarify the issues for me, I suppose. My response is
> exactly the same for your new version as it is for the original. The same
> as it is for Bruno's example in which the duplications involved explode to
> cover every possible permutation of pixel combinations that could occur
> over a 90 minute period on a telly.
>
> Perhaps a better tack might be to accept that I understand the issues
> under debate, and address the arguments that I offer directly rather than
> claim 'misunderstanding' etc.
>
> How can uncertainty arise in a subject who believes he knows all the
> relevent facts?
>
> How does a prediction of 50/50 not contravene the axiom that I survive
> anihilation and duplication into two (any number of) branches?
>
> regards.
>
>
> ------------------------------
> Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:12:55 +1300
> Subject: Re: Step 3
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it
> easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming
> comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do
> to an AI could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a
> human by MWI style splitting.
>
> What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn
> red and remain red. There are *copies *of it which see the ball go blue
> at various points...
>
> However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know
> what "it" will see, or to be more exact it knows that "it" will see all
> combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an "it" but a "them".
> Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which
> ones aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many
> AIs, with varied experiences.
>
> In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help,
> because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into
> different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are
> being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters
> - that its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours.
>
> So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything?
>
>
>
> On 30 October 2013 09:41, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>  On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Chris,
>
>  Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like
> this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to
> elaborate those details):
>
>  Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open
> field)
> Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and
> next to the ball is a note which reads:
>
> "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will
> begin.  In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork
> (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red
> for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process
> (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called
> the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball
> is set, another fork will happen.  This will happen 8 times leading to 256
> processes, after which the simulation will end."
>
> It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the
> next 1 minute and 8 seconds?
>
>
> I don't see that as any different.
>
>
> It is similar, but it never hurts to look at the same problem from
> different angles.  What is a little more evident in this case is that of
> the 256 possible memories of the AI about to meet its doom, none contain
> the memory of seeing all 256 possibilities, an in fact, the majority of
> them see the ball change color back and forth at random.  Only 2 see it
> stay all red or all blue for the last 8 seconds. None of them can predict
> from the view inside the simulation, whether the ball will stay the same
> color or change after the next fork occurs.
>
>
> The problem is still what is the referent of "the AI".  As John Clark
> points out "the AI" is ambiguous when there are duplicates.
>
>
> Personal identity is less of an issue in this case, because it concerns
> the AI or anything/anyone else inside the simulation who might also be
> viewing the ball.  In this way, it is slightly more analogous to MWI since
> it is the environment which is duplicated, not just the person, and so
> the apparent random changing of the ball color is also something that can
> be agreed upon by the group of observers within the simulation.
>
>
>   Sometimes Bruno talks about "the universal person" who is merely
> embodied as particular persons.  So on that view it would be right to say
> *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscom.
>
>
> But not "at the same time" or as "an integrated experience", so the
> appearance of randomness still arises from the first person perspective(s).
>
>
> But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories.  My
> view is that "a person" is just a useful model, when there is no
> duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or
> Bruno's teleporter.
>
>
> What model should be used in a world with duplication, fission machines,
> mind uploading, split brains, biological clones, amnesia, etc.? Or does
> personhood no longer make sense at all in the face of such situations?
>
> Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one
> psychological or physiological continuity can be successful.
>
> Jason
>
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