Hi Jason >> Right but when you refer to "the experience" or "chris peck's experiences", >> that is speaking in the third person.
It should make no difference to your argument at all. In fact Bruno's step 3 is written in the third person too. You're confusing how the set up is described with what is actually thought by the protagonists. In fact let me use a paragraph from Bruno's step 3 replacing the issues under debate, that way there can be no confusion about the fact that I not mistaking a 1-p view for a 3-p view any more than he is. Bruno's version (and take special note of the use of third person descriptions): Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty. This is remarkable because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of indeterminacy[10], bearing on the possible consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, as both diaries can witness. This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal ignorance. Corrected version: [Given] the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he [can] predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable [certainty]. This is [unremarkable] because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of [determinacy], bearing on the [certain] consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, [regardless of what] both diaries can witness. This is what I [shouldn't] call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. [Regardless] that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of 100% to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” [because] Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal [knowledge]. >> According to your usage, how is the meaning of "subjective certainty" >> different from just "certainty"? They are identical. Bruno argues that if everyone is certain or uncertain of something then this certainty become 'objective' in some sense. Its an irrelevant point he makes but nevertheless it is wrong. Its a confusion between solipsism and subjectivism. certainty and uncertainty are predicates applicable only to subjects. 'I's. And no matter how many people hold a belief or are certain or uncertain of something those certainties / uncertainties are only ever subjective. >> After the duplication there are two experiencers. <--[notice the third >> person description you're employing here!] Each is confronted with the >> impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would >> next have following the duplication. The knowledge that all experiences >> will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty. I keep pointing out that the question is asked prior to duplication and you keep ignoring that. >> According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know >> future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all >> possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the >> original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing himself >> becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not subjective in the >> sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should literally imagine >> what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber and be duplicated. Imagining what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber from a first person perspective is precisely what I am doing. And you can not ignore the fact that the experiencer will have a certain set of beliefs as he goes in. Infact, it is axiomatic to Bruno's reasoning that we assume the experiencer is a 'comp practitioner' who would 'say yes' to the doctor. ie. it is axiomatic that the experiencer has a very specific set of beliefs. If you don't take these beliefs into account then *you* are not imagining what it would be like to be the experiencer. So, when the question is asked, you are not about to see (Washington or Moscow), you are about to see (Washington and Moscow), because there is only one of you at this point, and critically -- and heres the bit which makes it genuinely 1-p -- you are certain of all this. Your subjective view, your 'what is it like to be', your phenomenological state, your whateveryouwantocallit, is saturated with the conviction that you are going to end up in both washington and moscow. There will be no room for doubt until you open your eyes at the terminal. At which point the game has changed radically. Now you know that you have been annihilated and duplicated but do not know which duplicate you are. Here you would predict 50/50 but not before. Certainly not when the question is asked in step 3. >> Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say >> in truth there is only one "I", but this does not remove the appearance of >> randomness as seen from the first person views Its my contention that there would be no appearance of randomness. Our perceptions are coloured by our beliefs. If we are genuine MWIers for example, we would not experience a feeling of randomness at all. We would percieve things as wholly determined. >> I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem? I wonder what >> answer you would agree with: I have. I studied Philosophy at UCL and watched Malcolm Budd and Ted Honderich tear Arnold Zuboff to shreds on a regular basis at departmental seminars. The thing is sleeping beauty is in a state of maximal ignorance so I don't see how it relates. >> Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the >> machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both >> locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), >> distinguish these two cases? Again, where there is ignorance there can be doubt. But it isn't the doubt you want which is doubt in state of maximal knowledge. >> Okay, that is fair. I'm beginning to think Bruno defines 'self' in terms of self reference within certain modal logics; provability logic etc. Its a circular definition which I imagine will be problematic. but again my modal logic is very rusty so I won't argue the point ... Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:18:48 -0500 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: jasonre...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 9:04 PM, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote: Hi Jason >> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me. Right but when you refer to "the experience" or "chris peck's experiences", that is speaking in the third person. >> This page offers some examples of the distinction ( >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' According to your usage, how is the meaning of "subjective certainty" different from just "certainty"? does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. Sure. >> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or >> prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what >> city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty. Certainty >> only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint >> of some external impartial observer. You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. After the duplication there are two experiencers. Each is confronted with the impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would next have following the duplication. The knowledge that all experiences will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty. Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. >> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by >> someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I". Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me. According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing himself becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not subjective in the sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should literally imagine what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber and be duplicated. Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I", but this does not remove the appearance of randomness as seen from the first person views, which is the main point of step 3: objectively deterministic processes which duplicate persons whose states diverge leads to the subjective feeling of unpredictability. This is no different than how Everett's many worlds explain the appearance of the unpredictable collapse. When I ask you what is the probability that your next experience will contain a block of U-238 in which all its atoms spontaneously decay in the next second, do you answer 100%? (because this does happen in some branches). >> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied. yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects. Okay nice. >>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet. I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem? I wonder what answer you would agree with: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem >> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one >> of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), distinguish these two cases? >> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be? Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. Okay, that is fair. Jason regards. Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"? I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now?" - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
