On 30 Oct 2013, at 10:31, LizR wrote:

On 30 October 2013 19:03, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

My point was only that the traditional notions of personal identity: saying this person is that one particular continuation of that biological organism, or of that one brain, do not work. They fail in cases of fusion, fission, duplication, radical change, amnesia, etc. and must be rejected in favor of more consistent definitions of personal identity.

That is exactly what comp does, and that is at least part of the point of the teleportation thought experiments. One of the results of comp is that personal identity is split into steps, normally called observer moments (the length of these moments isn't known),

Those are the computational steps ("3-OM"). Up to step 6, we can take the quasi-identity thesis, for the purpose of the reasoning (it does not really work with neither Newton, and is an open problem with QM, but with comp step seven shows a similar "problem").

and that personal survival from moment to moment is exactly the same as survival during a duplication experiment. In comp, at least, a person is a series of discrete states, a "Capsule theory" of memory and identity rather like the pigeonholes in Fred Hoyle's "October the First is too late".

Yes, but to belong to a computation, means that there is a universal machine which do the computation. It is a computable sequence, and computer science "laws" applies (it is not trivial). All states are related by universal machines, and the first person states, eventually, by infinities of universal machine.

If I send your Gödel number (a scanning of you) in an alien galaxy, they will only be able to reconstituted you if we succeed in betting on a universal interpreter. Universal code exists, but we need to bet on some inference inductive ability, and interest from the Alien.

So a person is not a series of discrete states, but a series of state computed by a universal machines. A series of discrete states can emulate a person, when it belongs to some genuine computations which involve some universal machine, in the 3p, and an infinity of universal machines in the 1p.

I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I have got anything wrong there.

Again, not wrong, but perhaps slightly unclear. (explaining the deaf short deaf dialog with Jason, perhaps).

All "pronouns" difficulties are cleared by taking literally the first person and third person notion defined in term of diaries taken or not taken in the teleportation boxes. By definition of comp, the doctor does not have to solve the "who am I " problem. Just to bet on the right genuine functionality level of the brain.

All this thread illustrates that the "personal identity" (Who am I) problem is orthogonal to the first person experience predictibility problem in self-duplication.

Comp makes it clear, that we survive in both city, from a 3p view, but that personally, we feel to survive in only one city. We can't predict which one in advance, as most copies will see that such a prediction has been shown wrong. John Clark and Chris Peck seems to avoid the last step of the experience: listen to the copy, or reading their personal (and unique for each copy) diaries.

If I am correct, both you and Jason have no problem with that, OK?


PS I have to go. (Might answer other posts later. Sorry for the delays).


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to