On 30 Oct 2013, at 10:31, LizR wrote:
On 30 October 2013 19:03, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
My point was only that the traditional notions of personal identity:
saying this person is that one particular continuation of that
biological organism, or of that one brain, do not work. They fail
in cases of fusion, fission, duplication, radical change, amnesia,
etc. and must be rejected in favor of more consistent definitions of
personal identity.
That is exactly what comp does, and that is at least part of the
point of the teleportation thought experiments. One of the results
of comp is that personal identity is split into steps, normally
called observer moments (the length of these moments isn't known),
Those are the computational steps ("3-OM"). Up to step 6, we can take
the quasi-identity thesis, for the purpose of the reasoning (it does
not really work with neither Newton, and is an open problem with QM,
but with comp step seven shows a similar "problem").
and that personal survival from moment to moment is exactly the same
as survival during a duplication experiment. In comp, at least, a
person is a series of discrete states, a "Capsule theory" of memory
and identity rather like the pigeonholes in Fred Hoyle's "October
the First is too late".
Yes, but to belong to a computation, means that there is a universal
machine which do the computation. It is a computable sequence, and
computer science "laws" applies (it is not trivial). All states are
related by universal machines, and the first person states,
eventually, by infinities of universal machine.
If I send your Gödel number (a scanning of you) in an alien galaxy,
they will only be able to reconstituted you if we succeed in betting
on a universal interpreter. Universal code exists, but we need to bet
on some inference inductive ability, and interest from the Alien.
So a person is not a series of discrete states, but a series of state
computed by a universal machines.
A series of discrete states can emulate a person, when it belongs to
some genuine computations which involve some universal machine, in the
3p, and an infinity of universal machines in the 1p.
I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I have got anything wrong there.
Again, not wrong, but perhaps slightly unclear. (explaining the deaf
short deaf dialog with Jason, perhaps).
All "pronouns" difficulties are cleared by taking literally the first
person and third person notion defined in term of diaries taken or not
taken in the teleportation boxes. By definition of comp, the doctor
does not have to solve the "who am I " problem. Just to bet on the
right genuine functionality level of the brain.
All this thread illustrates that the "personal identity" (Who am I)
problem is orthogonal to the first person experience predictibility
problem in self-duplication.
Comp makes it clear, that we survive in both city, from a 3p view, but
that personally, we feel to survive in only one city. We can't predict
which one in advance, as most copies will see that such a prediction
has been shown wrong. John Clark and Chris Peck seems to avoid the
last step of the experience: listen to the copy, or reading their
personal (and unique for each copy) diaries.
If I am correct, both you and Jason have no problem with that, OK?
Bruno
PS I have to go. (Might answer other posts later. Sorry for the delays).
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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