On 31 October 2013 10:50, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 10/30/2013 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> and that personal survival from moment to moment is exactly the same as
> survival during a duplication experiment. In comp, at least, a person is a
> series of discrete states, a "Capsule theory" of memory and identity
> I find that theory lacking.  It is usually expressed as a sequence of
> "observer moments" with the implication that the moment consists of a state
> of consciousness and that this state belongs to sequences according to its
> inherent content.  But how finely divided can these moments be?  If they
> are very fine then they haven't enough content to provide specific
> linkage to other moments and a given OM will fit in infinitely many
> sequences, including circular ones - so the theory effectively fails to
> identify any person at all.
> So suppose the OM are 'longer'; then they are not 'moments' and they can
> be connected by overlapping rather than by some 'inherent' content.  This
> is essentially Bertrand Russell's theory of time.
> Or suppose that even though they are short, so that there is no 'overlap',
> they have a lot of content that allows them to form specific enough
> sequences to be considered persons, e.g. memories.  But that is
> inconsistent with them being *conscious* moments - what one is conscious of
> is (a) not momentary and (b) doesn't usually include conscious memories.
> This problem can be avoided by supposing that the OM is more than just the
> observer's conscious thought, but rather a 'capsule' as envisioned by
> Julian Barbour.  But that effectively brings back physics and the brain as
> the extra information carried along with conscious thought.
> I think the point here is that IF consciousness is Turing-emulable,  THEN
it can be split up into discrete sequential states, which we can call OMs
for convenience, even though they may in practice be far shorter than
anything we'd recognise as a moment (e.g. they could be one Planck time
long). Since comp assumes consciousness is TE, OMs must exist in comp. The
question is whether this premise of comp is correct (at any level).

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