On 30 Oct 2013, at 05:25, chris peck wrote:

Hi Jason (again)

in your response to Brent:

>>Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological or physiological continuity can be successful.

ok, but in Bruno's step 3 it is taken as axiomatic that you survive in both branches because there is a continuity of psychological phenomena like memory. this is the 'yes doctor' axiom. Being an axiom Bruno doesn't need to defend it. We are obliged to assume it.

That said, taking issue with it is tantamount to admitting that we do not survive the teleportation, in which case the probability of me seeing Moscow or Washington is 0.

There is a concept of the observer moment. A discrete snippet of experience and the UD is churning these out willy nilly in a digital form. Or maybe they're all just there in an infinite plenitude of blah.


I don't use the notion of observer moment. But the UD emulates all possible brains in all possible environment (computable, or not computable, due to the dovetailing on the reals).




Now the observer moments can be in any old order.

Not statistically. Due to some theorem in computer science, you cannot change the order in any sense changing what happens on the neighborhood of infinity (that is the limiting process on which the first person plural realities should stabilize). We are just confronted to a monstruous complex problem, but the solution does not depend on any choice of the UD, and that gives tools to solve it.



A moment from tomorrow can be churned out before a moment from yesterday. Identity emerges as a trace of coherent memory. There is no need for an inherent order between the elements so long as there is some means of coherently connecting the observer moments. In this scheme the order is implicit in the notion of coherent memory.To use an analogy from IT , I suspect its the difference between sorting an array of shuffled digital cards or just keeping track of pointers to cards in an array when shuffling. Like wise physics emerges in this coherent trace. For example, in one observer moment a pen is dropped. Whats next? An observer moment where the pen goes down? One where it goes up? One where it goes right or left? All these moments are catered for in the infinite plenitude. So physics, here the law of gravity, becomes an investigation into a psychologically consistent trace of pen moments. All those where the pen keeps going down in my trace. Its going to be tricky to keep track of traces because they criss-cross. That is, all moments in some sense are coherent with one another. The pen down one vertical voxel is a consistent with moments where the pen is at any of the voxel neighbors, up down, left right, back forward. Taking different velocities into account it doesn't even have to be a neighboring voxel. Where is velocity anyway? Is it between the moments? Within the moments. A problem here I think.

Yes. That's what I did. To formulate a problem.




Anyway, the point is that continuity between moments seems to me to be a big, big deal in this scenario.

Up to say "no" to the doctor?

A 3p observer moment is determined by a UD computational step, or by some UD computational step. A 1p observer "moment" is determined by an infinities of computational histories. Histories are computations structured by the choice of the point(s) of view.

Bruno



So, if you are of the view that continuity isn't even sufficient to maintain identity then I wonder to what degree you really are on the same page as Bruno.

best regards.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Step 3
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 02:18:43 +0000

Hi Jason

You're presenting the exact same situation in a different context in the hope that it will clarify the issues for me, I suppose. My response is exactly the same for your new version as it is for the original. The same as it is for Bruno's example in which the duplications involved explode to cover every possible permutation of pixel combinations that could occur over a 90 minute period on a telly.

Perhaps a better tack might be to accept that I understand the issues under debate, and address the arguments that I offer directly rather than claim 'misunderstanding' etc.

How can uncertainty arise in a subject who believes he knows all the relevent facts?

How does a prediction of 50/50 not contravene the axiom that I survive anihilation and duplication into two (any number of) branches?

regards.


Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:12:55 +1300
Subject: Re: Step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI style splitting.

What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and remain red. There are copies of it which see the ball go blue at various points...

However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know what "it" will see, or to be more exact it knows that "it" will see all combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an "it" but a "them". Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with varied experiences.

In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours.

So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything?



On 30 October 2013 09:41, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:



On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Chris,

Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details):

Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end." It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds?

I don't see that as any different.

It is similar, but it never hurts to look at the same problem from different angles. What is a little more evident in this case is that of the 256 possible memories of the AI about to meet its doom, none contain the memory of seeing all 256 possibilities, an in fact, the majority of them see the ball change color back and forth at random. Only 2 see it stay all red or all blue for the last 8 seconds. None of them can predict from the view inside the simulation, whether the ball will stay the same color or change after the next fork occurs.

The problem is still what is the referent of "the AI". As John Clark points out "the AI" is ambiguous when there are duplicates.

Personal identity is less of an issue in this case, because it concerns the AI or anything/anyone else inside the simulation who might also be viewing the ball. In this way, it is slightly more analogous to MWI since it is the environment which is duplicated, not just the person, and so the apparent random changing of the ball color is also something that can be agreed upon by the group of observers within the simulation.

Sometimes Bruno talks about "the universal person" who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscom.

But not "at the same time" or as "an integrated experience", so the appearance of randomness still arises from the first person perspective(s).

But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories. My view is that "a person" is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter.


What model should be used in a world with duplication, fission machines, mind uploading, split brains, biological clones, amnesia, etc.? Or does personhood no longer make sense at all in the face of such situations?

Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological or physiological continuity can be successful.

Jason

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