On 10/18/2013 10:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/10/18 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of
From the paper:
"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down.
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"
But this is where the basis problem comes in. Why is the experience
Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the
(defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)
Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?
She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for
that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the
terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument
brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the
that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.
Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are
but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental
physics is to be explained in terms them. In that case you can't appeal to
physics to say why the experiences are classical.
Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition of something... But as we
don't know currently how consciousness arises from computation (nor if it can arises
from it), it's premature to ask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is
not that consciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable) then
physics as to be derived from computation alone...
I don't buy that argument yet either. It's not clear to me that counterfactuals can be
handled as Bruno and Maudlin propose.
and no Bruno doesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that up to
now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity (huge) of "dreams" is
compatible with MWI...
"There must be" IF is his theory is right. But then you can't cite MWI or classicality as
support for his theory - it's circular support.
but he does not know how consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this
mass and no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalism is true, then
physics has to emerge from computation alone,
He's made an argument. I don't think he's shown it.
the work left here (huge) is to show how. If one day you should be "uploaded" as a
computer program, and you still feel as alive as today and as yourself, it should be a
kind of confirmation that it is indeed the case, even if we have not workout the details
how physics emerge from computation and just worked on how to transfer our
consciousness... Well it would be for me...
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